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ARTICLES
The Paradox of the Drug Elimination Program in
New York City Public Housing*
Jeffrey Fagan,** Garth Davies,*** and Jan Holland****
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, violence and public housing have been closely linked in
political and popular cultures; to many, public housing symbolizes the dangers of
inner city urban life. Built mainly in the 1950s and 1960s to assist the poor and
working poor to escape "slum" conditions, most housing projects are clusters of
high-rise towers that were placed in neighborhoods already in the midst of
significant social structural change.' More recently, public housing design began
to include low-slung garden apartments, but these also were built in neighborhoods that traditionally were "slums" with high concentrations of many of the
correlates of violence.2
In the years following the Second World War, crime rates in neighborhoods
with public housing sites began to climb, and rapid population change and
economic decline had changed the fortunes of neighborhood residents for the
worse. 3 In the last twenty years, the notion that public housing is, by its physical

* This research was supported in part by Grant 034898 from the Substance Abuse Policy Research
Program, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. Several agencies generously provided data for this project:
the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, the New York City Public Housing Authority,
the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, and the New York City Police
Department. We owe special thanks to Phil Thompson for sharing the NYCHA databases, Susan Wilt for
providing access to injury epidemiology data from the NYC DOHMH, and Tamara Dumanovsky for
helping to launch the project and assemble the datasets. Several people provided valuable research assistance,
including Carolyn Pinedo, Nicole Mutter, Greg Paulos, Melvin Geiger, and Clifton Edwards. Shawndra Genice
Jones provided outstanding research assistance. All opinions are solely those of the authors.
** Professor of Law and Public Health, Columbia University.
*** Assistant Professor of Criminology, Simon Fraser University, British Columbia, Canada.
**** Research Analyst, Department of Epidemiology, Mailman School of Public Health, Columbia
University.
1. See Peter Marcuse, InterpretingPublic Housing History, 12 J. ARCHrrECTURAL & PLAN. REs. 240
(1995).
2. See id. at 242.
3. See generally, e.g., ALEX KOTLowrrZ, THERE ARE No CHILDREN HERE (1990); NICHOLAS LEMANN,
THE PROMISED LAND 200-14 (1991); see also LEE RAINWATER, BEHIND GHETro WALLS 59 (1966); ULF
HANNERZ, SOULSlDE (1969); JAMES GARBARINO, CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE SocIAL ENVIRONMENT 20
(1992).
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and social design, a dangerous milieu has been reinforced by rare but widely
publicized episodes of youth violence, sequential drug epidemics, and elevated
rates of drug-related violence. 4 Starting with the crack epidemic in the
mid-1980s, the high-rise towers of large, isolated, and ominous public housing
projects came to symbolize societal drug and crime problems. Recent studies
suggest that base rates of victimization and violent offending are higher in public
housing compared to other contexts, and that these problems can be attributed in
part to drug use and sale. 5
The intense activity in Chicago public housing by drug gangs,6 and the
takeover of Chicago's public housing in 1995 by the federal Department of
Housing and Urban Development, 7 reinforced these images of public housing.
Recent law and policy focusing drug control policies on public housing has
reinforced the connections between public housing, crime, and drugs.8 These
connections are routinely revisited in the press as a reminder of the persistence of
drug problems in public housing. 9
In response to these problems in large cities nationwide, the U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) launched the Drug Elimination
Program (DEP) in 1989.10 DEP funds were available to public housing
authorities solely to address drug problems.11 Drug problems included drug sale,

4. See, e.g., Camilo Jose Vergara, Hell in a Very Tall Place; Conditions in New York City Public
Housing Projects,THE ATLArIC, September 1989, at 72.
5. Timothy Ireland et al., Violence Among Adolescents Living In PublicHousing: A Two-Site Analysis,
3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 3 (2003); SUSAN POPKIN ET AL., THE HIDDEN WAR: Tim BATTLE TO

CONTROL CRIME IN PUBLIC HOUSING IN CICAGO (2000); Tamara Dumanovsky et al., Neighborhood
Contexts of Crime in New York City's Public Housing, Paper Presentation at the September Research
Institute on Neighborhood Effects on Low-Income Families, Joint Center for Poverty Research, The
University of Chicago and Northwestern University (1999) (on file with authors). Recent efforts by HUD
to conduct victimization surveys in public housing projects suggest elevated rates, but with a host of
methodological artifacts and complexities. See generally, e.g., Harold R. Holzman & Lanny Piper,
Measuring Crime in Public Housing: Methodological Issues and Research Strategies, 14 J. QuANTrTATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 331, (1998); Harold R. Holzman, Criminological Research on Public Housing:
Toward a Better Understandingof People, Places and Spaces, 42 CRIME & DELINQ. 361 (1996).
6.

See generally, e.g., SUDHIR ALLi VENKATESH, AMEICAN PROJECT: THE RISE AND FALL OF AN

AmEmcAN GHrETro (2000).
7. HUD's Takeover of the ChicagoHousing Authority: Hearing before the H. Subcomm. on Housing
and Community Opportunity, 98th Cong. 1 (1995) (statement of Judy A. England-Joseph, Director,
Housing and Community Development Issues, Resources, Community, and Economic Development
Division).
8. See, e.g., Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 136 (2002); Anti-Drug Abuse Act
of 1988, § 5101 etseq., Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988).
9. See e.g., N.R. Kleinfield, With Drugs in Open, Elderly Live Behind Locks, N.Y. TMEs, May 2,2004,
at 41 (describing drugs and violence in Harborview Terrace Houses on the west side of Manhattan,
primarily by illegal tenants in a housing complex with a high proportion of elderly residents).
10. See Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., Public Housing Drug Elimination Program, 54 FR 26154
(June 21, 1989) [hereinafter DEP Rule].
11. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, supra note 8, at § 5123.
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drug use, and drug-related violence.12 The program was flexible and diverse, a
reflection of the different needs and strengths of the local housing authorities. At
its core, DEP combined several strategies in a comprehensive design to prevent
and control drug use: police enforcement, drug treatment, drug prevention,
coordination of services with health and social service agencies, and development of the social infrastructure of formal and informal supervision groups in the
housing authorities.1 3
The New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) launched its local DEP
program in 1990 to reduce drug use, drug sale, and drug-related crimes in public
housing sites.1 4 The local programs are collaborations between NYCHA
management and local tenant organizations and residents to design and implement DEP activities.15 Supported activities included enhanced police protection,
drug treatment, drug prevention programs, youth and gang outreach, and
community organizing.' 6 DEP also supported capital projects, such as lighting
improvements and installation of closed circuit television surveillance. 7 There
have been programs in more than 85% of the sites for one or more years since the
program's inception in 1991, and funding reached $40 million in 1996.18
NYCHA spent more than $165 million on DEP over the program's seven years.1 9
Despite this large investment, there has been surprisingly little research on
DEP efforts in New York City, or in DEP sites nationally.20 More generally,
research on drug and crime control efforts in public housing is very limited 2 1 and
only rarely tied to specific policy frameworks. 22 The contradiction between the
severity of drug and crime problems in public housing and the relatively sparse
literature has left an important gap in our knowledge about the effects of drug
control strategies in public housing, neighborhoods and other small social areas.
NYCHA's 344 projects, and the extensive fiscal and programmatic investments

12. See id. at § 5122 (congressional findings supporting the passage of Public Housing Drug
Elimination Act of 1988).
13. See DEP Rule, supra note 10.
14. Columbia Univ. Mailman Sch. of Pub. Health, Drug Control in Public Housing: The Impact of the
Drug Elimination Program in the New York City Public Housing Authority, http://www.mailman.hs.columbia.edu/cvrp/proj-DrugPH.htm.
15. See, e.g., Tino Hernandez, You Have a Voice in NYCHA, 31 N.Y CITY Hous. AUTH. J. 3 (Aug.
2001), availableat http://home2.nyc.gov/html/nycha/downloads/pdf/j0l auge.pdf.
16. See id.
17.

See, e.g., FISCAL 1998 MAYOR'S MANAGEMENT REPORT-SEPTEMBER 1998 (SUMMARY) 9 (1998),

available at http://home2.nyc.gov/htmli/ops/downloads/pdf/1998_mmr/0998_summary.pdf [hereinafter
1998 MMR].
18. See N.Y. City Hous. Auth., Drug Elimination Grant Application Program, 1997 (on file with New
York City Housing Authority); Table 3, infra.
19. See Table 3, infra.
20. TERENCE DUNWORTH & AARON SAIGER, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., PUBLIC HOUSING
DRUG ELIMINATION PROGRAM RESOURCE DOCUMENT, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1994).

21. But see POp~iN ET AL., THE HIDDEN WAR, supra note 5.
22. But see Anthony Braga et al., Problem-OrientedPolicingin Violent Crime Places:A Randomized
Controlled Experiment,37 CRIMINOLOGY 541, 541-80 (1999).
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in DEP, provide a rich context for testing such drug control policies and thus
filling that gap.
In this study, we examine the effects of the DEP intervention at three levels of
complementary theoretical and practical relevance: the public housing development itself, the neighborhood in which public housing is situated, and the police
precinct where the tract is located. From surveys of residents, observations of
program activities, and analyses of NYCHA's program records, we compiled
detailed information on the components of DEP and the reactions of public
housing residents to each type of intervention. We then analyzed panel data from
1985-1996 to estimate the effects of DEP on crime rates in and around the city's
public housing projects before and after the implementation of DEP. We used
alternate measures of DEP interventions to provide robust estimates of the
contributions of DEP to the decline in the city's crime rates beginning in 1991, a
year after the onset of DEP. The results show that while DEP efforts were linked
to declines in crime rates in the census tracts and police precincts surrounding
public housing, there were no measurable declines in crime in the public housing
projects themselves. We draw lessons from theories of procedural justice and
social norms to explain why harsh treatment of public housing residents by police
and prosecutors may have generated resistance among public housing residents
to the legal norms that were the focus of DEP efforts.
We begin in Section I with a detailed description of the DEP Program
implemented by the New York City Housing Authority. Section II provides an
overview of NYCHA's Drug Elimination Program as implemented in the City's
public housing projects. Section III discusses the details of the research protocols
and analytic methods. Section IV presents the results for each of the three spatial
dimensions of program effects: the projects themselves, the census tracts where
public housing developments are sited, and the police precincts where DEP and
other law enforcement strategies were implemented and managed. Section V
discusses lessons for the theory, policy, and practice of drug control.
I.

THE NEW YORK

CrrY

HOUSING AUTHORITY

NYCHA is by far the nation's largest housing authority,23 with a population of
more than 600,000 residents in 344 public housing developments. 24 With more

23. In comparison, the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) administers 40,462 units. After these, the
largest PHAs include Philadelphia with 22,229 units; Baltimore with 17,119; and Boston with 14,400
units. See U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., HOUSING AUTHORrrY PROFIL.ES, available at
www.hud.gov/offices/pih/systems/pic/haprofiles/index.cfm.
24. NYCHA estimates its current resident population at more than 412,000. N.Y. City Hous. Auth.,
Fact Sheet 1, http://www.nyc.gov/html/nycha/downloads/pdf/factsheet.pdf (updated Jul. 26, 2006)
[hereinafter NYCHA Fact Sheet]. Official population counts of public housing residents tend to
undercount the total number of people living in public housing at any given time, however, in part
because of institutional incentives for tenants to underreport the number of people in their households.
Tenants are required to register family and income information with the Housing Authority annually. N.Y
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than 179,000 units, public housing constitutes approximately 8.6 % of all rental
housing in New York City.2 5 Most (69%) of the city's public housing developments were built before 1976.26 Most developments are large: only 9% have
fewer than 100 units, and most of these smaller developments were built after
1970.27 In contrast, 33% of all public housing developments in New York City
have more than 1000 units.2 8
Public housing is not randomly distributed across the five boroughs of New
York City, nor is it randomly sited in the city's neighborhoods. Over 85% of all
public housing in the city is in three boroughs: Brooklyn, Manhattan, and the
Bronx.29 Although dispersed outside the commercial center in Manhattan, public
housing is spread across most (fifty-three) of the city's seventy-five police
precincts. 30 As in other cities, this distribution reflects, in part, the decisions about
where to locate public housing. For example, relatively few public housing
developments were constructed in Queens, a largely middle-class, residential
area. 3 1 The largest cluster of public housing in Queens is in the Rockaways, an
area on the ocean near Kennedy Airport that is geographically much closer to
Brooklyn than to the center of Queens. 32 Staten Island has only eleven public
housing developments, and these are concentrated in the borough's densely
populated North Shore, near the ferry terminal.3 3
CrrY Hous. AuTH., A HoME TO BE PROUD OF: A HANDBOOK FOR THE RESIDENTS OF THE NEW YORK CrrY
HOUSING AUTHORITY 12-13 (2005), http://www.nyc.gov/html/nycha/downloads/pdf/tenant-handbook.
pdf. These figures are used to confirm eligibility for public housing, and in some cases are used to
determine rents. Id. at 13. Because of these administrative guidelines, tenants do not always report all
household members to the Housing Authority. These unofficial residents may be family members or
friends moving in for an extended period, or men living in otherwise female-headed single-parent
families. This complicates analyses that rely on these official statistics. Comparing 1980 and 1990 census
population numbers with NYCHA tenant counts for public housing developments whose boundaries
correspond to census block groups shows that NYCHA's official population numbers are consistently
lower than census numbers; on average, NYCHA population numbers were up to 30% lower than census
count. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Population and Housing, 1980,
Summary Tape File 3A, available at http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-STUDY/08071.xml
[hereinafter 1980 Census]; U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Population and
Housing, 1990, Summary Tape File 3A, available at http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSRSTUDY/09782.xml [hereinafter 1990 Census].
25. NYCHA Fact Sheet, supra note 24, at 1; see also generally Tamara Dumanovsky, Crime in Poor
Places: Examining the Context of NYC's Public Housing Projects (Sept. 1999) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, New York University) (on file with authors).
26. Cf. NYCHA Fact Sheet, supra note 24, at 2.
27. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., Asset Mgmt. Dep't, Project Data Annual Report 1995 (on file with
NYCHA).
28. Cf. id.
29. See NYCHA Fact Sheet, supra note 24, at 1.
30. The distribution of public housing across police precincts was developed by overlaying maps of
each. The public housing map was provided by NYCHA. The precinct map was provided by the NYPD.
31. See generally ARNOLD R. HIRSCH, MAKING THE SECOND GHETTO: RACE AND HOUSING IN CHICAGO,
1940-1960 (1983).
32. See NYCHA Fact Sheet, supra note 24, at 1.
33. See id; N.Y. City Hous. Auth., NYCHA Housing Developments, http://gis.nyc.gov/nycha/im
AddressMap.do [hereinafter NYCHA Map].
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In Manhattan, most developments are located above 110th Street or below
midtown on the Lower East Side, well removed from the city's wealthiest
neighborhoods and its commercial centers.34 Brooklyn has the most public
housing in the city, with the largest concentrations in the largely minority
neighborhoods of Brownsville, Bushwick, and East New York. 35 Particularly for
the larger developments in the "outer boroughs," such as Queensbridge,
Morrisania, or Brownsville, public housing tends to "ecologically"-socially,
economically and physically-dominate the surrounding areas, suggesting that
some areas are "public housing neighborhoods." 3 6
Table 1 shows that public housing developments are sited in census tracts with
higher crime rates than other areas. The average annual homicide count from
1985 to 1996 in census tracts with public housing projects is more than three
times higher (1.87 per year) than tracts without public housing.3 7 Figure 1 shows
that homicide rates were persistently higher over time in tracts with public
housing, and remained higher in 1996, after the city's overall rates had sharply
declined.
Table 1 also shows the extent of social disadvantage in tracts with public
housing sites. Compared to non-public housing tracts, these census tracts have
higher rates of households receiving public assistance, households below the
poverty level, female-headed households with children, renters, and minority
population. They tend to have fewer high school graduates, persons in managerial
or professional jobs, and persons working or in the labor force. They are more
racially heterogeneous, and their population density is greater.
Table 2 shows the size and characteristics of public housing developments for
the period from 1985 to 1996, the years for which we have detailed information
on tenant characteristics. The total population has declined in recent years, but
has remained poor and non-white. Household density has declined slightly, but
the percentage of seniors and children below ten years of age has increased. The
percentage of families on welfare has grown, as has the average duration of
residency. This suggests stability in the population, although at a rate where
households have fewer resources that would help them eventually move to other
housing contexts. With more children per household and long durations of public
housing tenancy, it seems unlikely that the social or human ecology of public
housing will change in the near future.

34. See NYCHA Map, supra note 33.
35. See id.; NYCHA Fact Sheet, supra note 24, at 1.
36. See GRTH DAVIES, CRIME, NEIGHBORHOOD AND PUBLIC HOUSING (2006). The sizes of the
developments are such that they are of central importance in defining the physical and social character of
a particular area.
37. The rates per 1,000 persons are .41 in tracts with public housing and .19 in tracts without public
housing.
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Table 1. Comparison of Social Indicators and Homicide Rates in New York
City Census Tracts with and without Public Housing Developments

Variable
Homicide (counts)*

Tracts With
Public Housing

Tracts without
Public Housing

Mean

Mean

SD

SD

1.87

1.29

0.53

0.75

31.54

13.36

11.65

11.54

0.47

0.04

0.36

0.09

% Households Under Poverty Level

38.39

13.76

15.63

13.23

% High School Graduates - Total 25+

51.20

12.95

68.16

15.75

% in Managerial, Professional, or
Technical Jobs

20.91

10.83

30.75

15.28

Employment Rate

83.32

6.72

91.11

6.64

Labor Force Participation Rate

50.97

9.31

61.81

11.24

% Nonwhite

85.74

22.67

51.14

35.71

0.45

0.15

0.37

0.20

21.56

10.28

8.70

9.55

1.60

0.90

2.52

2.16

20.28

6.05

14.02

6.50

% Households with Public Assistance
Income'
Gini for Total Household Income

Racial Fragmentation Index
% Female Headed Households with
Children < 18
Supervision Ratio (25-64 by 5-24)
% Youth Population (5-15)
Population

4885

2603

3118

2381

Residential Mobility - Same House as
5 Years Ago

66.42

8.92

62.51

12.08

% Foreign Born

17.05

12.19

28.56

14.98

% Linguistic Isolation

12.25

9.69

10.80

10.17

4.38

4.34

5.67

6.08

% Occupied Units that are Rentals

90.69

10.41

61.99

25.48

% Tracts Containing Public Housing

10.56

Vacancy Rate

Public Housing Population
% Tract Population comprised of
Public Housing

1801
37.37

1661
25.63

* Homicide measures are average for 1985-96 period. Per capita rates show similar
differences: .41 per 1,000 persons in public housing tracts, .19 per 1,000 persons in tracts
without public housing.
± All variables are calculated from 1990 Census Data, which is midpoint of 1985-96
study interval.
Sources: Authors' analysis of New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene,
Office of Vital Statistics and Epidemiology, homicide records (on file with NYCHA);
authors' analysis of 1990 Census, supra note 24.
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Figure 1. Homicide Rates in NYC Census Tracts
With and Without Public Housing, 1986-96
60

ts With Public Housing
50

40

cr 30
T acs
W outPublic Housing

0 20

0

1986

1987
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1989
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1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

Year
Source: Injury Prevention Program, New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, various years.
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Table 2. NYCHA Population, Household Size and Population
Characteristics, 1985-96 (N= 184)

Persons
Families Average
%
%
Total
Total
per
%
on
Residency
% Population Population
Year Population Families Household Seniors Welfare
(years) White below 10
10-17
1985

447,944

160,545

2.79

11.9

27.5

13.3

9.3

17.5

19.7

1986

441,483

160,481

2.75

12.3

27.6

13.8

9.1

17.7

19.2

1987

434,763

159,915

2.72

12.4

27.5

14.4

8.8

17.8

19.0

1988

432,160

159,152

2.72

12.5

28.6

14.9

8.4

18.3

18.8

1989

422,445

159,974

2.64

13.4

28.6

14.9

7.6

18.3

17.5

1990

422,347

160,578

2.63

13.6

29.3

15.4

7.4

19.1

17.6

1991

424,308

160,162

2.65

13.5

30.3

15.7

7.0

19.1

17.6

1992

410,586

159,207

2.58

13.2

30.9

15.0

6.4

20.6

17.6

1993

413,923

160,029

2.59

13.2

31.1

16.2

6.4

20.6

17.5

1994

399,822

156,042

2.56

13.3

31.1

16.7

6.2

20.6

17.9

1995

391,420

153,936

2.54

13.4

31.0

17.1

6.0

20.5

18.2

1996

392,430

155,325

2.53

13.4

30.1

17.1

5.9

20.4

17.8

Source: Authors' analysis of New York City Housing Authority, Annual Tenant
Recertification Surveys, various years (on file with NYCHA).
II. Tim DRUG ELIMINATION PROGRAM

NYCHA first sought DEP funds from HUD in 1989, and a small pilot program
was funded in 1990.38 A far larger program was supported starting in 1991, and,
by 1995, DEP was a presence in most of the public housing developments in New
York City. 39 Funding levels for the various components of DEP are shown in
4
detail in Table 3, and are summarized in broader categories in Table 4. 0
The primary goal of DEP was to reduce drug use, drug sale, drug-related crime
and collateral crime problems by strengthening both formal and informal social
control in public housing developments.4 1 Increased police presence and targeted

38. N.Y City Hous. Auth., Drug Elimination Program Grant Applications, various years (on file with
NYCHA).
39. Id.
40. Table 3 identifies fourteen categories of programs under the umbrella label of "social and
community services": resident programs, community center programs, domestic violence program,
anti-graffiti, streetworker, youth sports, seasonal jobs, summer youth employment, parenting skills,
career training, City Scouts, Partners in Reading, the anti-drug school program DARE/GREAT, and drug
elimination staff.
41. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 761.1, 761.5; N.Y. City Hous. Auth., Drug Elimination Program Grant
Applications, various years (on file with NYCHA).
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Table 3. DEP Annual Budget by Program Components, 1991-96
1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

$4,222,697

$4,417,763

$7,395,957

$14,040,143

$22,030,824

$19,441,604

Tenant Patrol

59,371

76,547

178,055

165,000

1,136,995

1,265,038

Anti-Narcotics Strike
Force

76,186

122,677

82,482

978,781

648,603

1,060,803

Drug Abuse Contracts

4,171,410
2,680,339

2,033,244

1,329,826

Programs
Operation Safe Home

Treatment Services

838,544

Drug Prevention

1,325,224

1,034,117

Drug Abuse Treatment

819,216

Domestic Violence
Program

750,000

395,000

1,040,548

94,305

Resident Programs

1,276,448

2,810,786

2,436,709

5,211,291

605,000

1,198,470

3,025,849

10,622,000

8,445,052

Anti-Graffiti

1,406,013

969,381

1,211,636

Seasonal Jobs Program

6,123,174

1,518,993

1,110,179

Community Center
Programs
Youth Sports
Programming

Summer Youth
Employment
Parenting Skills

109,298

24,948

78,997

Career Training

2,773,627

1,388,870

5,769,208

80,926

248,148

Streetworker

188,898

City Scouts
Drug Elimination Staff

1,862,234

127,790
334,005

243,176

671,876

Grants Administration

65,000

150,000

167,921

Partners in Reading

182,105

D.A.R.E./G.R.E.A.T.

97,976

Security Repair Team

249,700

Security Repair
Materials

531,522

Physical Improvements

294,000

Police Equipment

118,000

Total

$12,698,781

$15,035,363

$15,500,837

$38,827,377

$40,578,147

$35,000,000

Source: Authors' analysis of New York City Housing Authority, Drug Elimination
Program Grant Applications, various years (on file with NYCHA).
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Table 4. Annual Budget Allocation by DEP Program Components,
1991-99 ($M)
Program Type
Drug Abuse
Treatment
and
Prevention

Social and
Community
Services

Security
Equipment

Total

Operation
Safe Home

Tenant
Patrol

AntiNarcotics
Strike Force

1991

4.223

0.059

0.076

5.010

2.549

0.781

12.699

1992

4.418

0.077

0.123

4.006

6.413

0.000

15.035

1993

7.396

0.178

0.082

2.033

5.811

0.000

15.501

1994

14.040

0.165

0.979

1.330

21.902

0.412

38.827

1995

22.031

1.137

0.649

1.034

15.728

0.000

40.578

0.917

Year

1996

19.442

1.265

1.061

12.315

0.000

Total

71.55

2.88

2.97

14.33

64.718

1.193

157.64

Percent

45.3

1.83

1.88

9.1

41.05

0.08

100

35.000

Source: Authors' analysis of New York City Housing Authority, Drug Elimination
Program Income and Expense Reports, Phase II - Phase IX, reported between 12/31/95 to
12/31/99 (on file with NYCHA).
prosecutions were the mechanisms to increase formal social control. Operation
Safe Home (OSH) was the primary public security program. 42 Under OSH, the
Housing Police created intensive patrols in and around public housing sites.43
The Anti-Narcotics Strike Force (ANSF) received DEP grant funds to support
special prosecution activities primarily to evict tenants with drug arrests. 44 As
Table 3 indicates, slightly less than one dollar in three went to police patrols
through OSH in the first two years. By the third year, almost half the budget was
allocated to OSH; by 1995, more than half the funds went to OSH. ANSF funding
was modest but stable throughout the study period. It remained a small fraction of
the overall NYPD budget for all its bureaus, including transit and housing as well
as patrol.45

Stronger tenant organizations and increased resident patrols were the primary
strategies to strengthen informal social control. NYCHA tenant organizations
were encouraged to become active in producing security through the creation of
Drug Elimination Committees, Tenant Patrols, and Community Center Programs.
Over the years, DEP also offered services and programs to address issues more
42. See 1998 MMR, supra note 17, at 11.
43. See id.
44. See Tino Hernandez, A Tribute to Detectives Rodney J. Andrews and James V Nemorin, 33 N.Y
CITY Hous. AUTHORITY J. 3 (Apr. 2003), availableat http://home2.nyc.gov/html/nycha/downloads/pdf/
j03apre.pdf.
45. Compare, e.g., CnZENs BUDGET COMM'N, THE STATE OF MUNICIPAL SERVICES INTHE 1990S: THE
NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT, Growth in Resources (1997), availableat http://www.cbcny.org/police/
policefrm.htm ($2,325,000,000 spent on all NYPD direct agency operating expenses in 1996); andTable
3, infra ($1,060,803 spent on ANSF in 1996).
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indirectly related to the reduction of drug-related crime, such as a Domestic
Violence Program, a Career Training Program, and arts and sports activities.
As Table 3 indicates, when the Giuliani mayoral administration took office in
1994, the DEP budget more than doubled to $38.8 million. But both the percent
of DEP funds and the actual dollar amounts allocated to demand reduction
programs dropped sharply, while funding for Operation Safe Home more than
doubled to $14 million. For example, drug abuse treatment and prevention
services received a declining share of the budget over the course of DEP, from
more than one third of the 1991 budget to less than 3% in 1996. The decline in
real dollars during this time is also striking, from $5 million in 1991 to about $1
million in 1996. Tenant patrols, designed to engage residents of public housing in
the co-production of security, were modestly but stably funded throughout the
program. But the share of total DEP funds allocated to tenant patrols also dropped
sharply as program funding metastasized in 1994, unchecked by any political
process or accountability mechanism. Overall, although social and community
services funding rose in 1994 as DEP expanded, funds for these programs were
dispersed across fourteen separate categories. When diffused across the NYCHA
system, the funded amounts per development were inconsequential.
The expansion of DEP in 1994, and the sharp shift in funding priorities to
strengthen OSH, reflects broader shifts in law enforcement strategy and social
policy in New York City in 1994, following a change in mayoral administration.
The emphasis on street-level enforcement in New York City has been widely
described 46 and analyzed; 4 7 in brief, "Broken Windows theory" argued that, to
reduce serious incidents of violence, policing should address minor disorders
such as public drunkenness and loitering, and concentrate on neighborhoods with
visible signs of non-criminal disorder, such as empty lots, abandoned cars, and
dilapidated buildings. 48 The DEP budget trends reflect not just the shift in policy
choices; there were substantive changes in strategy, tactics, and policing style
beginning in this period that provoked strong public reactions, and raised
contentious claims about the role of policing to bring about citywide crime
reductions. 49 Declining investment in drug abuse treatment and prevention was

46. See, e.g., WILIAM BRATTON & PErER KNOBLER, TURNAROUND (1998); Judith A. Greene, Zero Tolerance:
A Case Study of Police Policiesand Practicesin New York City, 45 CRIME & DELNQ. 171 (1999).
47. See, e.g., GEORGE KEHiNG & CATHERINE COLES, FIxNG BROKEN WINDOWs 108-56 (1996); N.Y STATE
ATrORNEY GEN., STOP AND FRISK REPORT (1999) [(hereinafter STOp AND FRISK REPORT]; Jeffrey Fagan & Garth
Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorderin New York City, 28 FoRDHAM URB. LJ.
457 (2000) [hereinafter Street Stops] (arguing that Broken Windows-inspired "stop and frisks" in New York City
more often aggressively concentrated on minority neighborhoods characterized by poverty and social
disadvantage than on places characterized merely by physical disorder).
48. See James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, The Police and Neighborhood Safety: Broken Windows,
ATLANTIC MoNTiLY, Mar. 1982, at 29-38. In practice, "the implementation of Broken Windows policies was
disproportionately concentrated in minority neighborhoods and conflated with poverty and other signs of
socio-economic disadvantage" in New York. Street Stops, supra note 47, at 462.
49. See, e.g., BERNARD HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER 92 (2001); ANDREW KARMEN, NEW YORK
MURDER MYSTERY 87-88 (2000); MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT 133-41 (2d ed. 2000).
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part of the Giuliani administration's general social policy shift and
theoretical
50
strategies.
reduction
demand
de-emphasized
which
re-orientation,
Below, we describe details of the major components of DEP: Operation Safe
Home, Tenant Patrols, Anti-Narcotics Strike Force, and Drug Treatment.'
A. Operation Safe Home
Operation Safe Home (OSH) was considered the "linchpin" of NYCHA's Drug
Elimination Program.5 2 OSH focused on increasing the presence of uniformed
officers and law enforcement activities in public housing developments with the
goal of providing a more secure living environment for its residents by combating
serious crime. The program emphasized "vertical patrols" of problem areas in
public housing and subsequent maintenance to keep areas safe.53 OSH teams
patrolled indoor and outdoor areas, conducted systematic building patrolslasting from several weeks to several months-and worked with management
teams to improve physical security at targeted sites (e.g., repairing broken
lighting and door locks).
OSH involved two separate groups, Target Teams and Maintenance Teams.
"Target Teams," consisting of five officers and one sergeant, were deployed to
selected developments in an attempt to "take back" a development building by
building, often conducting vertical patrols in the larger buildings. OSH officers
encouraged residents to form tenant patrols and provided training and assistance
to these patrols. Officers also reported any instances of physical damage or
vandalism to management staff, who were expected to attend to the maintenance
needs of the target developments. The Target Phase lasted for up to a month and a
half, after which a "Maintenance Team," usually two officers, were given
periodic patrols at the recently "completed" developments.5 4 Maintenance Teams
were responsible for insuring that the work of the Target Teams remained
effective after they moved on to a new development.
The number of police officers participating in OSH increased from forty-eight

50. At the same time, though, the courts created and expanded a network of specialized treatment courts
designed to divert drug offenders from criminal prosecution to substance abuse treatment See Greg Berman et
al., Institutionalizing Innovation: The New York Drug Court Story, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 277, 278, 282-85
(2000). But these programs were open to all eligible criminal defendants, and public housing residents effectively
lost their dedicated pathway into drug treatment Cf. Katherine E. Finkelstein, New York to Offer Most Addicts
TreatmentInstead of JailTerns, N.Y TIMES, June 23, 2000 at Al.
51. For more detailed descriptions and analyses of the program components, see JEFFREY FAGAN ET
AL., ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. DRUG CONTROL IN PUBLIC HOUSING: THE IMPACT OF THE DRUG

ELIMINATION PROGRAM OF THE NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTorrY 28-51 (2003) [hereinafter DRUG
CONTROL IN PUBLIC HOUSING].

52. See N.Y City Hous. Auth., Drug Elimination Program Grant Application, 1991 (on file with authors).
53. "Vertical patrol is a process by which a Police Officer systematically and methodically checks
each building one at a time, covering roof landings, stairwells and lobbies." N.Y. Police Dep't, Frequently
Asked Questions, http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/misc/pdfaq2.html.
54. N.Y. POLICE DEP'T, NYPD OPERATION SAFE HOME, 1994 YEAR END REPORT (on file with authors).
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in 1991 to eighty-one in 1994." Each Police Service Area (PSA) 56 was assigned
one or two Target Teams and one Maintenance Team, giving each PSA between
five and ten OSH officers by 1994. 57 In 1995, when the Transit Police and
Housing Police were merged with the NYPD, OSH grew from eighty-one
officers and nine sergeants to 400 officers with fifty-seven sergeants. 5 Following
the 1994 change in mayoral administration, the OSH budget doubled the next
year, and increased again by 50% the following year.59 It remained at that level
through the end of the decade.
B. Tenant Patrols
Through the Tenant Patrol Program, NYCHA involved residents in resisting
drug-related crime in their developments. Volunteer residents, under the direction
of a tenant patrol supervisor, walked the grounds of their public housing
development in an effort to deter criminal activity. The tenant patrol supervisors,
part-time employees of NYCHA, were funded through DEP-and were usually
former tenant patrol volunteers. In case of emergency, supervisors had the ability
to contact local police through the Citywide Telephone Monitoring System. In
addition to crime deterrence, the patrol had an "early intervention" component,
which identified and addressed common maintenance problems like broken
lights, thermostats, and unclean lobbies.
NYCHA envisioned the patrols as the "eyes and ears" of the housing police
and considered the tenant patrols one of the more important aspects of the Drug
Elimination Program, in that it helped to create a bridge between the police and
the community.60 The tenant patrols worked with local police precincts and
public housing management to identify problem areas on public housing
grounds, providing a basis for cooperation between residents, NYCHA staff and
the local police. As developed under the NYCHA DEP, the level of activity of the
tenant patrols corresponded with that of OSH. During periods when OSH fielded
intensive vertical patrols of high-rise units, recruitment efforts for the tenant
patrols were increased. 61 This was an interesting but perhaps futile effort to marry
a rigorous and intrusive law enforcement strategy with the development of social
networks that would broaden residents' share of the job of social regulation and

55. See N.Y. POLICE DEP'T, NYPD OPERATION SAFE HOME, YEAR END REPORTS, various years (on file
with NYCHA).
56. Under the Housing Authority Police Department, PSAs were administrative units comparable to
NYPD police precincts. For example, the South Bronx is PSA 7.
57. See N.Y. POLICE DEP'T, NYPD OPERATION SAFE HOME, YEAR END REPORTS, various years (on file
with NYCHA).
58. N.Y. POLICE DEP'T, NYPD OPERATION SAFE HoME, 1995 YEAR END REPORT (on file with authors).
59. See Table 3, supra.
60. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., Drug Elimination Program Grant Application, 1995 (on file with authors).
61. See N.Y. City Hous. Auth., Drug Elimination Program Grant Applications, various years (on file
with NYCHA).
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the production of security.
NYCHA's Tenant Patrol Division had fifteen staff members, whose duties
included coordinating and conducting training sessions for volunteer tenant
patrol supervisors and providing support for the supervisors once the patrol was
under way.6 2 After the start of DEP, these efforts were closely coordinated with
the OSH interventions. As OSH expanded, NYCHA found that the Tenant Patrol
Division staff was not able to keep up with the tenant patrol volunteers' demand
for complementary police patrols to support their efforts. By 1993, tenant patrol
volunteers requested that each target site have its own tenant patrol staff. In
response, subsequent DEP budgets included salaries for twenty additional
community coordinators ("field associates") and supervisory staff, who were
deployed across DEP sites.6 3 As a result, the Tenant Patrol Program's budget
expanded seven-fold, from $165,000 in 1994 to $1.1 million in 1995. 6 4 By 1999,
the Tenant Patrol Program had 213 part-time (twenty hours per week) tenant
patrol supervisors, working with 6650 volunteers at 795 buildings; active tenant
patrols were in place at 144 separate developments.65
Despite this growth, the budget share for this component of DEP remained a
small fraction of the total DEP budget and was dwarfed, starting in 1995, by the
budget for police interventions. Over the study period, OSH consumed 45.5% of
the total DEP outlay, compared to 1.8% for tenant patrols.6 6
C. The Anti-Narcotics Strike Force
The Anti-Narcotics Strike Force (ANSF) was a team of attorneys, investigators, and support staff that was created in 1988 within NYCHA's Law
Department. Its focus was the eviction from public housing of persons involved
in the illegal distribution and sale of narcotics.
Prior to 1971, NYCHA could evict tenants with only one month's notice and
without a hearing. 67 In response to a 1967 challenge to these evictions, NYCHA
entered into a consent decree that required a multiple-stage review process,
including legal notice, representation, a NYCHA hearing, and appeals for all

62. See N.Y City Hous. Auth., Drug Elimination Program Grant Applications, various years (on file
with NYCHA); N.Y. POLICE DEP'T, NYPD OPERATION SAFE HOME, YEAR END REPORTS, various years (on
file with NYCHA).
63. See N.Y. City Hous. Auth., Drug Elimination Program Grant Applications, various years (on file
with NYCHA); N.Y. POLICE DEP'T, NYPD OPERATION SAFE HoME, YEAR END REPORTS, various years (on

file with NYCHA).
64. See Table 3, infra.
65. See N.Y. City Hous. Auth., Drug Elimination Program Grant Applications, various years (on file
with NYCHA); N.Y. POLICE DEP'T, NYPD OPERATION SAFE HOME, YEAR END REPORTS, various years (on

file with NYCHA).
66. See Table 3, infra.
67. See Escalera v. New York Hous. Auth., 425 E2d 853, 856-58 (2d Cir. 1970) [hereinafter EscaleraI].
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eviction cases.6 8 When DEP was created, recent changes in federal law provided
an enabling framework for ANSF prosecutions, 69 and the law has been
strengthened since. In 1996, President Clinton announced the "One Strike"
policy, essentially restating the provisions of the 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, to
encourage public housing authorities to apply the 1988 provisions to speed the
eviction of residents involved in criminal activity.70 Also in 1996, a federal judge
granted NYCHA the right to use the Bawdy House Law--originally intended to
allow evictions for vice, particularly prostitution-in cases involving drug
traffickers.71 Most recently, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld this provision in the
case of Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker, a Ninth
Circuit case involving the eviction of a sixty-three-year-old grandmother and her
family based on the drug arrest of her mentally-disabled granddaughter several
blocks away from public housing grounds.7 2
Between 1991 and 1993, ANSF dedicated a total of two investigators, out of a
team of thirteen, to cases arising solely from DEP targeted sites.73 In 1994, ANSF
staff expanded capabilities, adding a total of five investigators through DEP
funds. 74

68. Pedro and Rose Escalera were tenants in New York City public housing. They filed a class action
lawsuit in 1967 under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against NYCHA, alleging
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and the United States Housing Act of 1937,
42 U.S.C. §§ 1401. Before trial, the parties entered into settlement which later was incorporated into a
decree, known as the "Escalera Decree." See Escalera v. New York Hous. Auth., 924 F. Supp. 1323, 1327
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) [hereinafter Escalera11] (reviewing procedural history of the action).
69. The federal Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 strengthened existing public housing lease provisions by
including language in the leases to the effect that: "A public housing resident, any member of the
resident's household, or a guest or other person under the resident's control shall not engage in criminal
activity, including drug-related criminal activity, on or near public housing premises ... and such
criminal activity shall be cause for termination of tenancy." Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, supra note 8,
at § 5101. A resident does not need to be convicted of criminal activity to be considered in violation of
Section 5101. Id.
70. See William Jefferson Clinton, PreparedText for the President'sState of the Union Message, N.Y.
TaMEs, January 24, 1996, at A14.
71. See Escalera , 924 F. Supp. at 1344; N.Y. REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW § 711,
715 (McKinney 2006) (collectively forming the Bawdy House Act); see also generally Valerie D. White,
Note, Modifying the Escalera Consent Decree: A Case Study on the Application of the Rufo Test, 23
FoRDa.M Ua. L.J. 377 (1996) (arguing for the need to use the "Bawdy House" proceedings to address
drug problems in public housing); Bill Alden, Procedureto Evict Drug Dealers Eased; Modification of
1071 ConsentDecree Granted.N.Y.L.J., Apr. 22, 1996, at 1.
72. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (holding that the federal Anti-Drug Abuse
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (1994) requires lease terms that give local public housing authorities the
discretion to terminate the lease of a tenant when a member of the household or a guest engages in
drug-related activity, regardless of whether tenant knew, or should have known, of the drug-related
activity). In New York, public housing officials have similar discretion to evict tenants following a
conviction of a co-resident on drug charges. See Escalera11, 924 F Supp. at 1343-45.
73. See N.Y. City Hous. Auth., Drug Elimination Program Grant Applications, 1991, 1992, 1993 (on
file with NYCHA).
74. See N.Y. City Hous. Auth., Drug Elimination Program Grant Application, 1994 (on file with
NYCHA).
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D. Drug Abuse Treatment and Prevention Program

DEP's drug abuse intervention and prevention programs focused on two target
populations: adolescents and pregnant or post-partum women.7 5 The main goal
was to provide treatment services for drug-addicted pregnant and post-partum
women and treatment and prevention services for drug-addicted or at-risk
adolescents through three strategies: (1) NYCHA hired community outreach
workers to identify drug-addicted residents; (2) the Department of Health
provided counselors to prepare drug-addicted residents for treatment; and (3) the
program contracted out to local treatment service providers for the treatment
component of the program.76 These programs included health education,
individual counseling and group activities.7 7 In addition to this primary focus, the
program provided referrals to treatment services for drug-addicted residents not
included in the program's target populations.7 8
Funding declined over the years for these services. NYCHA allocated $4.2
million in 1991 to fund pilot programs in three large public housing developments: Brownsville, East Harlem, and the South Bronx (Mott-Haven and
Morrisania). 79 These funds were not spent during the first DEP year, but instead
were re-allocated over subsequent years. By the end of 1993, NYCHA had
established contracts for treatment services for the three target sites and wanted to
expand the search for treatment providers citywide. No further funds were
allocated for these contracts; NYCHA continued to use the 1991 fiscal funds for
most treatment contracts. 80 By the end of 1992, NYCHA stopped contracting
directly with drug treatment service providers and the emphasis of the program
shifted to outreach and referrals.
Slow referral rates illustrated the problems with this component of DEP. By
January of 1993, two years after the DEP startup, a total of 139 residents had been
referred to drug treatment providers. 8 ' However, not until 1994 were residents
referred to programs under contract with NYCHA. NYCHA reported that
between July and December 1994, 215 pregnant and post-partum women and 140
adolescents from the three pilot sites were referred to contracted programs. 82 An

75. See N.Y. City Hous. Auth., Drug Elimination Program Grant Applications, various years (on file
with NYCHA).
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See N.Y. City Hous. Auth., Comprehensive Annual Financial Report 1991 (on file with NYCHA).
80. Difficulty in administering the program contracts was the stated reason for the decision to
decelerate treatment funding. In particular, NYCHA had trouble ensuring that providers were fulfilling
their contracts. For example, one treatment provider, which NYCHA had contracted with in August 1995,
had provided no services as of December 1995. NYCHA considered initiating default proceedings
against the contractor.
81. See N.Y. City Hous. Auth., Drug Elimination Program Grant Applications, various years (on file
with NYCHA).
82. See id.
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additional 305 residents-not part of the program's target population-were
referred to other treatment providers. 83 Between July and December 1996,
fourteen pregnant and post-partum women from seven different neighborhoods,
296 adolescents, and 105 other residents were referred to treatment services. 84 In
1998, 801 cases that were identified as having substance abuse problems during
Termination of Tenancy action proceedings were referred to the Drug Abuse
Outreach, Referral, and Placement Program by NYCHA management. 85
III.

RESEARCH METHODS

To assess DEP impacts, we use longitudinal panel models to estimate the
effects of DEP on crime and violence in and around public housing from 1985 to
1996, controlling for drug enforcement and the social and structural contexts of
public housing and the surrounding neighborhoods. We estimate the effects of
DEP in three ways. First, we conduct a simple test of whether the mere presence
of DEP had any effect, without considering the various effects of the program's
different aspects.8 6 Second, we test whether dollar investments were related to
DEP effects. 87 Third, we test the specific effects of each of the program's primary
components of policy and theoretical interest-OSH and the tenant patrols.8 8
Since a significant portion of DEP funds supplemented law enforcement efforts
(through OSH), we include drug arrests as a measure of law enforcement that was
underwritten by DEP funds.
A. Study Sample
The study sample is 184 public housing sites, 53.5% of the 344 NYCHA
housing developments. We excluded sixty-four public housing developments
(PHDs) that do not fit the traditional definition of public housing.8 9 After

83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. That is, we include DEP as a "dummy variable," a binary variable where the value is zero for the
period before DEP implementation and one for each year starting in 1991.
87. That is, we tested the effects of DEP as a continuous (random) effect measured by DEP dollar
investments, using zeros for the years before DE.

88. That is, we tested the effects of DEP as discrete dosages of these two components.
89. Three categories of public housing were excluded from the sample: buildings that are part of the
Multi-Family Home Ownership Program (MHOP), senior-only projects, and scattered-site housing.
Under MHOP, NYCHA rehabilitated apartments in city-owned buildings and offered them for sale to
working families in public housing. See Glenn Thrush, Promises,Promises,Crrv LIMITS, June/July 1997,
at 1. Although these sites are administered through NYCHA, they are not comparable to other public
housing site because they are part of a home-ownership program, and they are therefore excluded from
this study.
Senior-only projects were excluded from the sample because they introduce different issues for
understanding crime in public housing. Most family projects have a senior population ranging from 10%
to 15%. Authors' analysis of NYCHA tenant surveys (on file with NYCHA). Excluding senior-only sites
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accounting for administrative consolidations 90 among the remaining 280 PHDs,
the final sample totals 184 PHDs. The final study sample includes all family
PHDs in New York City built before 1985. 9 '

B. Variables, Measures, and Data Sources

1. Drug and Crime Indicators
NYCHA Incident Reports. Until the New York City housing and transit police
departments merged with the NYPD in 1995, NYCHA's housing police maintained
independent records for public housing developments. Therefore complete and
consistent data is available for 1985 through 1994 for all NYCHA housing projects.
These data are available in two forms. For the entire ten-year period, aggregated
incident reports are available for each site. These reports include the total number of
incidents reported to housing authority police broken down by FBI Uniform Crime
Report Index Crime codes for Part I and Part HI offenses.9 a Also, detailed incident
reports are available for the entire 1985 to 1994 period. These files include details for
each incident, including location (inside a building, or outside, in public area, a
sidewalk adjacent to the development, etc.), along with information on weapons,
characteristics of the victim and perpetrator (where applicable), and whether or not the
victim is a resident.
NYPD PrecinctArrest and ComplaintReports. We contrast trends in drug and

does not have much impact on the age distribution of public housing residents. In 1990, for example, the
senior population for all 233 projects totaled 14.6%, while for the sample of 182 projects, seniors account
for 13.6% of the 1990 population. Id.
The final exclusion is scattered site projects. These are generally single, walk-up buildings that have
been rehabilitated and are indistinguishable from other buildings in the area, such as the West Side Urban
Renewal (WSUR) buildings throughout the Upper West Side of Manhattan.
90. Administrative consolidations of public housing developments generally take one of two forms.
The first kind of consolidation occurs with larger public housing developments (PHD). Although built
contemporaneously, certain PHD sites combine two separate developments. A second type of
consolidation is an amalgamation. This occurs when a new building is added to an already existing
development. Amalgamations include developments such as Red Hook I & II, Queensbridge North &
South, Throggs Neck & Addition, and Millbrook & Extension. In some cases, crime complaints and
arrest reports are combined for two or more projects due to geographic proximity. In addition, because
data are combined for two or more developments, there is no way to determine in which PHD a specific
incident occurred. Because there is no way to determine the exact site corresponding to the incident
reports, tenant characteristics are consolidated across these projects, and they are considered one site for
the purpose of this study.
91. For purposes of comparability, this study also excludes developments built after 1985. The few
developments built after 1985 are distinct from other public housing sites. They are much smaller, and
tend to be rehabilitations of existing buildings or scattered sites.
92. See generallyU.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING

HANDBOOK (2004), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/handbook/ucrhandbook04.pdf. Index crimes
include: murder, manslaughter, armed robbery, aggravated assault, rape, kidnapping, motor vehicle theft,
arson of an occupied dwelling, burglary, and grand larceny. Id. at 2.
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crime indicators for the NYCHA developments with the surrounding contexts of
the local police precincts. There are at least two reasons to do this. First, arrest
and crime reporting trends are significantly influenced by policies and strategies
that are undertaken at the local police precinct level. For example, if a precinct
commander emphasizes targeting drug dealers rather than burglars, reporting trends for
that precinct will likely reflect an increase in drug-related crime and a decline in
burglaries, regardless of whether there is an increase in the actual number of
drug-related crimes and a decrease in actual number of burglaries occurring on the
street. Further, prior to the consolidation of the NYPD and the Housing Police
Department, separate data on enforcement and crime indicators were not kept for
public housing sites and the rest of the surrounding precinct, which complicates
analyses designed to estimate crime specifically in public housing sites. Using separate
measures for precinct crimes and crimes in NYCHA sites allows us to estimate more
precisely the interaction of crimes in neighborhoods surrounding public housing with
crimes on public housing properties. Second, precinct indicators provide an estimate of
larger trends in crime in the neighborhoods surrounding the NYCHA developments. In
previous research on crime in NYCHA developments, we estimated hierarchical
regression models-models that simultaneously include both housing development
factors and factors describing the surrounding police precinct-and found that the
precinct variables were significant predictors of crime in the housing developments.9 3
Complete NYPD Precinct Arrest and Complaint Reports from 1984 through
1996 aggregate numbers of UCR crime categories (Part I and Part II) by
precinct. 94 However, the precinct totals for Part I offenses do not include Housing
Authority Police Department incidents, which were recorded by NYCHA until
the consolidation of the Housing Authority Police with the NYPD in 1995.
Accordingly, comparisons of offenses compiled by the NYPD with NYCHA
incident data should be made with caution, since the two crime reporting systems
were maintained by separate law enforcement agencies.
Homicide. We use homicide victimization data from the Office of Vital Statistics
and Epidemiology, New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, to
construct homicide counts for each census tract and police precinct from 1986 to
1996. 95 The Vital Statistics records are compiled from death certificates completed by
the Office of the Medical Examiner. Integrating investigation information from the
New York City Police Department, the Medical Examiner independently categorizes

93. See, e.g., Dumanovsky et al., supra note 5; Dumanovsky, supra note 25, at 134-49.
94. These records are on file with the NYPD.
95. The Office of Vital Statistics codes homicides based on the last known address of the victim. In
some cases, the location of the homicide may be some distance from the victim's residence. We examined
Medical Examiner records to determine the distance from the victim's home to the location where the
body was recovered for young males aged 15-24 who were killed between 1987 and 1992 and found that
80% of their bodies were recovered within one mile of their homes. We did not examine this for all
homicides in the sample, although we have no empirical or theoretical reason to assume that the findings
would differ for other demographic groups. Therefore, here we equate the victim's residence with the
location where the body was recovered.
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homicides using ICD-10 codes, the international standard diagnostic classification for
health and vital records.96
2. Social Structural Variables
a. NYCHA Tenant and Site Characteristics
Tenant and public housing site characteristics were obtained from NYCHA's
archived records. NYCHA interviews public housing tenants annually and
maintains yearly records of tenant characteristics for each project. This data is
available from 1968 through 1996, aggregated by project and race: white, black,
Hispanic and other. The data items, relatively consistent across time, include total
number of families, total population, average income, number of minors, number
of elderly, number of welfare families, one-parent families, employment (number
of families with two or more persons employed), average tenancy, and number of
minors broken down by age group.
Site measures include total number of buildings, housing units, whether a
development is reserved exclusively for the elderly, and the borough, community
district, and police precinct for each project.
b. Tract and Precinct Social Structural Characteristics
We included measures of social and economic factors that reflect contemporary theory regarding neighborhood, "place," and violence, theories that incorporate not just the social and economic disadvantage of social areas with high crime
rates, but also their dynamic processes of social control.9 7 We selected eighteen
tract-level variables from the 1980,98 1990, 99 and 200000 Census files and sorted

96. World Health Org., International Classification of Diseases, http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/
en/.
97. For over a century, criminological research has sought to identify the characteristics of places that
have elevated crime rates within cities. Most theoretical and empirical work has focused on concentrated
poverty, high rates of unemployment, single parent families, low rates of home ownership, racial
residential segregation, and low ratios of adults to children that can compromise supervision of
adolescents. See generally ROBERT J. BURSIK, JR. & HAROLD GRASMIK, NEIGHBORHOODS AND CRIME: THE

DIMENSIONS OF EFFEC'nvE COMMUNrY CONTROL (1993) (variations in rates of neighborhood crime are
best understood as the consequence of the differential abilities of local communities to control the
behavior of their residents); Jeffrey D. Morenoff et al., NeighborhoodEquality, Collective Efficacy, and
the Spatial Dynamics of Urban Violence, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 517 (2001) (in addition to concentrated
disadvantage, urban violence is explained by low collective efficacy, or the linkage of social control and
cohesion); Robert J. Sampson et al., Assessing "Neighborhood Effects:" Social Processes and New
Directions in Research, 28 ANN. REv. Soc. 443 (2002) (at the neighborhood level, differences in
delinquency and violence are accounted for by social-interactional and institutional mechanisms,
including neighborhood ties, social control, and institutional resources); Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies,
The Natural History of Neighborhood Violence, 20 J. CorrEMP. CRIM. JUST. 121 (2004) [hereinafter
Natural History] (the structural position of a neighborhood, its social and spatial relationships, and its
connectedness to its surrounding areas, are all important for understanding the patterns of violence in
neighborhoods over time).
98. 1980 Census, supra note 24.
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Table 5. Social Structural Characteristics of New York City Census Tracts
and Police Precincts, 1990
Tracts
Variable

Mean

SD

Precincts
Mean

SD

%Households with Public Assistance Income
13.03
11.95
14.26
10.87
Gini for Total Household Income
0.38
0.08
0.40
0.07
%Households Under Poverty Level
18.91
14.22
20.99
12.50
% High School Graduates - Total - 25+
66.16
15.48
66.57
14.36
%in Managerial, Professional, or Technical
Jobs
29.73
14.78
32.45
14.90
Employment Rate
90.32
6.01
89.93
4.53
Labor Force Participation Rate
59.65
9.52
60.01
8.01
%Nonwhite
56.49
35.28
59.05
29.99
Racial Fragmentation Index
0.39
0.18
0.48
0.15
%Female Headed Households with Children
< 18
10.44
9.53
11.02
8.27
Supervision Ratio (25-64 by 5-24)
2.29
1.35
2.27
1.13
%Youth Population (5-15)
15.33
6.13
14.93
5.58
Population
3446
2312
95524
43237
Residential Mobility - Same House 5 Years
Ago
62.91
9.42
61.94
5.41
% Foreign Born
28.67
14.65
27.10
12.51
% Linguistic Isolation
11.10
9.47
11.43
8.18
Vacancy Rate
5.51
4.43
6.01
3.08
% Occupied Units that are Rentals
65.82
25.02
73.97
18.18
Source: Authors' analysis of 1990 Census, supra note 24.
them into seven constructs that reflect theoretically relevant dimensions of
ecological or neighborhood risk. Dimensions include the following: poverty,
racial residential segregation, social control, population mobility (anonymity),
labor force participation, housing structure, and immigration. The specific
measures are shown in Tables 5 through 8. All data were aggregated at the
housing development, census tract, and precinct levels. The various constructs
were created for each of the three census years, and were then interpolated for the
interceding years.

99. 1990 Census, supra note 24.
100. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of Population and Housing, 2000,
Summary File 3, available at http://webapp.icpsr.uniich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-STUDY/13374.xml.
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Social Control. We computed two dimensions of social control. The first captured
the extent of supervision of young people within neighborhoods, including (1) the
concentration of youth population, (2) the percent of female-headed households with
young children, and (3) the ratio of youths to adults. The second dimension
examined population size and change, including (1) the overall size of the
population and (2) residential stability and turnover, based on length of residence.
Poverty. We computed three indicators of poverty: (1) percentage of households with incomes below the poverty level, (2) percent of households receiving
public assistance, and (3) a measure of inequality of household income of that
tract relative to other tracts in the City, the "Gini coefficient."' '
Labor Market Participation.Labor market participation and human capital
within the tract were measured with several variables: (1) employment rates, (2)
percent employed in professional or managerial jobs, (3) the percent of the adult
population over twenty-five with a high school education, and (4) the overall
labor force participation rate (i.e., those working and those seeking work).
Racial Residential Segregation. We used a measure of racial fragmentation to
characterize segregation and population heterogeneity within census tracts.102

101. The Gini coefficient is a measure of income inequality. More information, including details on
the calculation of Gini coefficients, is available at http:lwww.statsdirect.comlhelplnonparanetricmethods/
gini-coefficient.htm.
102. We have computed residential racial fragmentation here as

I-

I '(pi)2

Where P = proportion of each race within the spatial unit.
To understand this measure of racial fragmentation, imagine that a hypothetical census tract, Tract A, is
comprised of 80% Blacks, 10% Whites, and 10% Hispanics. Because the composition of the tract is
dominated by one group, we would characterize this as tract as having low fragmentation. Computationally, the fragmentation index is:
=1- ((.8)2 + (.1)2 + (.1)2)
= 1 -

((.64) + (.01) + (.01))

= 1 -. 66
= .34

Compare this to another hypothetical tract, Tract B, where the composition of the population is more
fragmented, or less dominated by one group: 40% Blacks, 30% Whites, and 30% Hispanics. The
fragmentation index is:
= I - ((.4)2 + (.3)2 + (.3)2)
= 1-((.16) + (.09) + (.09))
= 1- .34 = .66
The greater fragmentation of Tract B is evident in its higher fragmentation index.
According to our analysis of 1990 Census data for New York, African Americans are more likely to
reside in the most homogeneous tracts, while Hispanics are far more likely to live in racially
heterogeneous areas:

Quintile

% African Americans

% Hispanic

1 (Most segregated)

33.74

5.63

2

23.25

13.01
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Housing Structure and Market Conditions. Three dimensions of housing were
computed: (1) vacancy rates (the percentage of vacant housing units), (2)
overcrowding (the mean number of persons per room in residential units), and (3)
the percent of housing units that are owner-occupied or rented.
Immigration. Two dimensions of immigration were computed: (1) linguistic
isolation and (2) whether the head of the household was foreign-born.
C. Descriptive Statistics
Social and economic characteristics of tracts, precincts, and housing projects
are shown in Tables 5 and 6. These measures are the average of the 1980 to 2000
census measures. Tracts populations range from ten to 25,105, with a mean
population of 3446 persons. Precincts obviously are larger, with populations
ranging from 23,021 to 225,027, and an average population of 95,624 persons.1 03
Public housing developments have populations that range from ten to 7411, with
a mean population of 2267.4.'04
There are some revealing measures in Table 6 about NYCHA's public housing
developments. The developments in the sample for this study are quite large,
averaging more than ten buildings per site, and number that no doubt is pushed
higher by the small number of very large projects with multiple buildings. Since
we excluded consolidations and amalgamations, the large size of these projects is
noteworthy. More than 40% of the population are minors below eighteen years of
age, and 13.75% are seniors. Tenure averages more than fifteen years, a
remarkably long and stable period of residence for most families. But officiallyreported incomes are extremely low, averaging $12,525 per family per year.
Nearly one in three families receive either "welfare" (TANF) or other forms of
public assistance. Fewer than 5% of the households in public housing have two
adults in the home who are employed. One family in five is a single-parent family
with minor children. Just as populations in public housing are under-reported to
avoid violations of NYCHA contracts and rules, there are strong incentives to
engage in informal economic activity and avoid other sources of income that

Quintile

% African Americans

% Hispanic

3

25.32

27.68

4

27.34

36.32

5 (Least
segregated)

20.26

32.09

Our index of racial fragmentation for New York was based on methods developed by Charles Lewis
Taylor & Michael C. Hudson. See CHARLES LEWIS TAYLOR & MICHAEL C. HUDSON, WORLD HANDBOOK OF
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS 216 (1972).
103. The Central Park precinct has a very small population but some crime. The models in the sections
that follow were unaffected by excluding this precinct.
104. o" = 1,577.5.
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Table 6. Social and Economic Characteristics of NYCHA Residents and
Developments, 1986-95
Variable

Mean

SD

Income
%Minors (Under Age 21)
%Seniors (Age 62 and Older)
%Families Receiving Welfare
%Families with One Parent and Children < 18
%Families with 2 or more Persons Employed
Racial Fragmentation Index
Tenure
Number of Buildings

12525
43.49
13.75
29.35
21.28
4.56
0.46
15.53
10.47

3537
7.92
7.63
12.11
9.76
3.49
0.15
3.56
9.28

Source: Authors' analysis of New York City Housing Authority, Annual Resident
Certification Surveys, various years (on file with NYCHA).
might jeopardize eligibility if known to authorities.1 0 5
D. DataAnalysis
1. Data Reduction
For each of the three spatial aggregations, we characterized and measured
theoretically meaningful dimensions of "neighborhood" by reducing a set of 18
commonly used demographic and economic variables to a smaller subset of variables
that represent potential influences on crime rates that work independently or in
conjunction with law enforcement efforts. The data reduction method, principle
components factor analyses, identifies correlations among these variables and uses
these correlations to consolidate the variables to smaller sets of highly correlated
variables. 1°6 Accordingly, this technique replaces several variables with one, and
provides a factor score that represents all the variables within a subset. Criminological
theory suggests that the dimensions we identified are a prioriconstructs that capture
structural features of neighborhoods that are correlated with variations in crime rates.' °7
These features serve as co-variates, which are factors that are potential theoretical
moderators of the relationship between the DEP interventions and the measures of
crime that are our test criteria. 108 Factor analyses were completed for each year in the
panel, and the summary scores for each factor or dimension were then used in the

105. See, e.g., supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., BURSIK & GRASM1K, supra note 97, at 41-45.
107. See, e.g., JAE-ON KIm & CHARLES W. MuELLE, FACTOR ANALYSIS:

STATISTICAL METHODS AND

PRAcncAL IssuEs (1978).

108. That is, as moderators, they may influence the relationship between DEP and crime because either the
co-variates affect the DEP variables or because they are independently correlated with the crime outcomes.
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regressions as predictor of crime that reflects changing neighborhood conditions that
interact with DEP effects. To simplify and illustrate, Table 7 shows the factor
derivations for tracts and precincts for 1990, and Table 8 shows factor derivations for
the public housing developments, also for 1990.
For tracts and precincts, factors vary in their explained variance-that is, how
much of a phenomenon is explained by the combination of variables. Poverty and
inequality factors are strong, explaining 88.5% of the variance for tracts, and
92.9% for precincts. Anonymity and housing factors are the weakest, with
explained variance ranging from 51.9% to 66.4% for tracts and precincts,
respectively. For public housing developments, we constructed two factors, and
we used single measures for other co-variates in the model. Table 8 shows the
explained variances for a poverty factor and a social control factor.
2. Model Estimation109

109. There are inherent difficulties associated with linear (OLS) regression to analyze per capita
crime rates for aggregated units such as census tracts or precincts. See generally D. Wayne Osgood,
Poisson-Based Regression Analysis Of Aggregate Crime Rates, 16 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 21
(2000). Accordingly, we use a modified Poisson regression approach to resolve this problem, where the
Poisson models of counts are transformed into models of per capita offense rates through the inclusion of
logged population as an independent variable in each of the models. Id. at 23-24.
We used mixed effects overdispersed Poisson regression models with an autoregressive co-variance
structure to estimate the impacts of DEP on crime and violence rates in and around public housing. The
Poisson distribution is a discrete distribution which takes on the values y = 0, 1, 2, 3 ..... It is often used
as a model for the number of events (such as the number of telephone calls at a business or the number of
accidents at an intersection) in a specific time period. It is useful in studies of law and crime to model the
number of crimes or the number of prison sentences. Poisson techniques are appropriate to identify
factors that predict the number of occurrences of an event within a specific observation period See PETER
KENNEDY, A GUIDE TO ECONOMETRICS (1995); WILLIAM GREENE, ECONOMETC ANALYsIs (5th ed. 2000).
Poisson distributions typically assume that events are inevitable and that they follow some known distribution
or frequency pattern. However, when events are widely dispersed around an average or a regression line,
computational adjustments are needed to estimate standard errors that account for observations that are widely
dispersed from the mean. See William Gardner et al., Regression Analyses of Counts and Rates: Poisson,
OverdispersedPoisson, and Negative BinomialModels, 118 PSYCHOL. BULL. 392 (1995). (A potential difficulty
with the Poisson specification lies with the assumption that the variance is equal to the mean, a condition often
encountered in event data that are customarily overdispersed (where the variance exceeds the mean, as is often
the case when there are large numbers of zeros in the observations).
All models were run in using the GLIMMIX macro in the SAS Generalized Linear Model procedure.
The procedure is PROc MIXED, applying the GLIMMIX macro for generalized linear models with mixed
effects. SAS, Inc., Cary, NC. See Judith Singer, Using SAS PROC MIXED to Fit Multilevel Models,
HierarchicalModels, and IndividualGrowth Models, 24 J. EDuc. & BEHAV. STAT. 322 (1998); see also
JUrTH SINGER & JoHN WnEr, APPLIED LONGITUDINAL DATA ANALYSIS (2003).
We specify both fixed and random effects to simulate a hierarchical panel design or growth curve
model. See SINGER & WILLETr, supra;GREENE, supra, at 743-44. We include fixed effects for project and
neighborhood characteristics, fixed effects for prior year indicia of violence and crime, drug enforcement
in the prior year (lagged), and the social and economic indicia of the various ecological contexts. We include
random effects for time (to account for within-neighborhood change over time) and a quadratic term for time, and
random effects to account for the time-varying contributions of DEP funding over the panel.
We include a Moran's I statistic to assess spatial autocorrelation in the crime measures and as a control
for crime rates in adjoining areas. Moran's I is a comparison of the value at any one location with the
value at all other locations in adjacent (first order) or nearby (second order or higher) spatial units.
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Table 7. Principle Components Factor Analysis, New York City Census
Tracts & Police Precincts, 1990
Precincts

Tracts

Factor

Explained
Explained
Component Eigenvalue Variance Component Eigenvalue Variance

Poverty/Inequality

2.65

88.5

% Households Under Poverty
Level

0.971

0.980

% Households with Public
Assistance Income

0.940

0.941

Gini for Total Household
Income

0.909

0.971

Labor Market/Human Capital

2.69

67.2

%High School Graduates Total - 25 +

0.929

0.942

%in Managerial, Professional,
Technical Jobs

0.836

0.895

Employment Rate

0.774

0.899

Labor Force Participation Rate

0.726

0.915

Segregation

1.30

64.8

Racial Fragmentation Index

0.805

0.739

% Nonwhite

0.805

0.739

Supervision

2.27

75.6

%Youth Population (5-15)

0.937

0.917

% Female Headed Households
with Children Under 18

0.847

0.844

Supervision Ratio (25-64 by
5-24)

-0.819

Anonymity

51.9

Population - 1990

0.720

0.815

Residential Mobility - Same
House as 1985

0.720

0.815
1.53

76.7

Linguistic Isolation

0.876

0.896

Foreign Born

0.876

0.896

Housing Structure

92.9

3.33

83.4

1.09

54.7

2.38

79.3

1.33

66.4

1.61

80.3

1.18

58.8

-0.909
1.04

Immigration

2.79

1.15

57.3

% Occupied Units that are
Rentals

0.757

0.767

Vacancy Rate

0.757

0.767

Source: Authors' analysis of 1990 Census, supra note 24.
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The general analytic model estimates DEP effects on drug-related and other
crime indicators. Control variables include drug enforcement and the social
structural characteristics of the housing project, tract or precinct, depending on
the model. The effects of DEP and drug enforcement measures are lagged by one
year-that is, estimated from each prior year onto crime outcomes in the next
year. We estimate separate models for violent and property crimes in housing
projects and police precincts. We estimate models for homicides to assess DEP
effects on murders in public housing developments. And we included interactions
of DEP with the social-structural characteristics in each unit of analysis to isolate
more effectively the effects of DEP on specific dimensions of crime risk.
In the tract and project models, we control for crime rates in the surrounding
areas to account for spatial diffusion from housing developments to their
surrounding neighborhoods.1 " 0 For tracts, we use the data for the surrounding
police precinct. For the housing project estimates, we also use the crime rate in
the surrounding police precinct. For this analysis, we would rather have used
tracts, since tracts usually are smaller and surround public housing sites. But
some larger public housing sites occupy one or more census tracts. To avoid this
isomorphism between tract and NYCHA site, we relied instead on crime rates in
the surrounding police precincts. Although they are heterogeneous units with
ambiguous social meaning, precincts have the advantage of being the administrative unit where policing policies are implemented and managed. Because of the
large size of precincts, we did not include a spatial control in the analyses of
precinct-level effects.
V. RESULTS

A. Estimates of DEPEffects
As discussed in the last section, we used three different measures to estimate
Moran's I requires an intensity value for a crime point (represented here as the centroid of the census
tract). This point is then assigned an intensity value, in this case the count of crimes within that tract. The
Moran's I result varies between - 1 and + 1. Values closer to + 1 indicate high degrees of clustering of
similar values, either high (positive) or low (negative). Conversely, values closer to - 1 demonstrate
dispersion, where areas with high values are surrounded by neighbors with low values, and vice versa. A
Moran's I of 0 suggests that spatial autocorrelation is absent and event occurrence is random. Spatial
autocorrelation also permits analyses of the displacement and diffusion of drug-related violence into the
surrounding neighborhoods.
Finally, we included a measure to account for the endogeneity of crime and social disadvantage within
each spatial unit (public housing site, tract, and precinct). The measure is the predicted value from a
Poisson regression of the crime (or homicide) count in the initial year in each series (1986), predicted
from the social structural variables.
110. For example, Fagan and Davies have found evidence of spatial diffusion of homicide from
housing developments to their surrounding neighborhoods in the Bronx, one of New York's five
boroughs. Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Crime in Public Housing: Two Way Diffusion Effects in
ANALYZING CRIME PATTERNS: FRONTIERS OF PRACTICE 121, 130 (V. Goldsmith et al. eds., 1999); see also
Dumanovsky et al., supra note 5 (showing that crime rates in public housing were dependent on the crime
rates in the surrounding neighborhoods).
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Table 8. Factor Composition-NYCHA Public Housing (1990)*
% Explained
Factor

Public Housing Poverty
%Families Receiving Welfare
Income

Component

Eigenvalue

Variance

1.71

85.5

0.925
-0.925

PublicHousing Social

1.84
91.8
Control
% Minors (Under Age 21)
0.958
% Families with One Parent
0.958
and Children Under 18
* Factor scores were computed for each year from 1985-96; 1990 shown as illustration.
Source: Authors' analysis of 1990 Census, supra note 24.
DEP effects: (a) a binary measure set at zero for the years preceding DEP and one
for the years in the panel when DEP was in effect, (b) a measure of total DEP
funding for each year in the series, set at zero for the years preceding DEP, and (c)
specific estimates of the effects of OSH and Tenant Patrols, based on DEP
investments in these specific components. We limited the components analysis to
these two programs due to multicolinearity-that is, statistical redundancybetween these two components and the ANSF and Drug Services components." l
We could not model project-specific interventions, since many of the DEP
components were implemented in wide areas encompassing several public
housing developments. For example, in the later years of DEP, some programs
were borough-wide programs.'1 12 For the tract and public housing developments,
we also include measures of crime in the surrounding areas for the tract and
public housing components. For the latter, we use the crime rate in the precinct
where the development is located. We would have preferred a smaller unit, such
as the surrounding census tract or some other definition of "neighborhood." But
some developments were larger than one tract or straddled the borders of two
tracts, complicating the boundary decision. DEP effects were lagged by one year,
as were the effects of drug arrests.

111. Multicollinearity is a problem in regression models because of "overfitting" that is misleading
due to the redundancy among the independent variables. In simple terms, the model appears strong when
independent variables are correlated with each other, but it really is not identifying factors that uniquely
explain the distribution of the dependent variable. The best regression models are those in which the
predictor variables each correlate highly with the dependent (outcome) variable but correlate at most only
minimally with each other. See, e.g., Rand R. Wilcox, Multiple Hypothesis Testing Based on the Ordinary
Least Squares Regression Estimator When There is Heteroscedasticity, 63 EDuc. & PSYCHOL.
MEAsuREMENT 758 (2003)
112. See DRUG CONTROL IN PUBLIC HOUSING, supra note 51, at 5, 32.
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1. Precinct Effects
Separate analyses examined DEP effects on property and violent crimes.
Violent crimes included reported and verified felony crimes of robbery, rape, other sex
crimes, murder, manslaughter, kidnap, and assault. Property crimes included reported
and verified felony crimes of larceny, motor vehicle theft, and burglary.
Table 9a shows the models for DEP effects on violent crimes. For all three
measures, DEP interventions significantly reduced crime rates over time. The
effects of the control variables vary by DEP measure, so there is no clear picture
of the effects of factors such as drug arrests or the concentration of public housing
in a precinct. In all three models, the social structural co-variates suggest that
concentrations of structural risk are correlated with higher violence rates.
Analysis of DEP components suggests that these effects are specific to OSH
interventions. More aggressive police patrol, coupled with police efforts to
sustain the initial crime reduction contacts through the "maintenance teams,"
significantly contributes to lower violence rates. The effects of tenant patrols,
designed to strengthen informal social control, does not appear to affect violence
rates at the precinct level.
Of course, precincts are complex places, and there are many confounding and
unobserved factors that might drive these results. There are two contradictory
findings in the investment and components analyses that complicate the
interpretation of DEP effects on precinct-wide crime rates. On one hand, the
fewer the number of public housing sites, the higher the violent crime rates. DEP
was implemented in the public housing sites only, and its effects on the
surrounding areas are uncertain. Accordingly, we cautiously view the effects on
crime rates as concentrated in the public housing sites, since DEP interventions
were focused specifically in public housing sites. But violent crime rates were
higher in precincts with higher concentrations of population in public housing.
This may be a project size proxy, since the population concentration reflects the
presence of very large developments that often dwarf the surrounding areas.
Crime problems are more severe in larger projects, 113 and this variable may be
capturing the influence of the overall higher crime rates in precincts where
developments are spatially concentrated.
The effect of DEP on property crime rates is clearer. Table 9b shows that DEP
interventions are statistically significant in all three models, including the
components model. Controls for public housing sites in the precinct are not
statistically significant for the property crime models, and drug arrests are
significant in only one instance. In the components model, both OSH and tenant
patrols are statistically significant, but in opposite directions. It is not hard to
understand why these two components should work against one another, since
these investments moved in opposite directions over time. But why these

113. See, e.g., Dumanovsky et al., supra note 5.
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Table 9a. Mixed Effects Poisson Regression of DEP Effects on Violent
Crime Rates, New York City Police Precincts, 1986-96
DEP Binary
Effect
Intercept
Time
Time

2

DEP

p(t)

t

DEP Investment
p(t)

t

Drug Possession Arrests
(logged)

p(t)

0.020

1.27

0.209

0.60

0.550

13.25

0.000

12.61

0.000

5.63

0.000

-13.18

0.000

-12.29

0.000

-5.55

0.000

-9.10

0.000

-5.35

0.000

-13.36

0.000

1.94

Tenant Patrols

% Population in Public
Housing

t

2.38

Operation Safe Homes

Number of Public Housing
Sites

DEP Components

-1.39
1.55

0.164
0.122
0.000

-3.81

-2.39
2.47
-0.96

0.018

-3.14

0.057
0.002

0.014

3.27

0.001

0.339

1.66

0.099

1.16

0.248

2.56

0.011

0.36

0.723

11.13

0.000

15.22

0.000

15.34

0.000

Population (Logged)

3.06

0.002

5.83

0.000

6.58

0.000

Poverty

3.60

0.000

2.01

0.046

2.15

0.034

Human Capital

3.16

0.002

2.35

0.020

2.50

0.014

Segregation

2.68

0.008

5.92

0.000

5.65

0.000

Social Control Supervision

1.92

0.055

0.41

0.685

1.09

0.276

Social Control Anonymity

0.27

0.787

0.29

0.770

Immigration

1.03

0.305

0.21

0.832

0.60

0.548

Housing

4.15

0.000

5.75

0.000

6.47

0.000

Drug Sale Arrests (logged)
Endogeneity
Precinct Social
Characteristics

-0.62

0.536

DEP Interactions
DEP*Poverty

-0.07

0.944

-0.33

0.739

-1.06

0.290

DEP*Human Capital

0.25

0.805

-0.49

0.626

-0.58

0.563

DEP*Segregation

1.50

0.135

-0.80

0.422

-0.29

0.769

DEP*Supervision
DEP*Anonymity

-0.38
0.52

0.708

0.75

0.454

1.62

0.107

0.605

-1.23

0.220

-1.43

0.156

DEP*Immigration

-0.26

0.796

-0.90

0.367

-1.78

0.077

DEP*Housing

-0.91

0.365

-1.24

0.215

-0.77

0.441

Model Statistics: -2LL

-827.00

-301.7

-473.2
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Table 9b. Mixed Effects Poisson Regression of DEP Effects on Property
Crime Rates, New York City Police Precincts, 1986-96

Effect

DEP Binary
t
p(t)

DEP
Investment
t
p(t)

Intercept

1.71 0.091

-2.59

0.012

Time

9.71 0.000

13.30

0.000

Time

2

DEP

-9.76

0.000

-12.85

0.000

-6.91

0.000

-11.19

0.000

Operation Safe Homes
Tenant Patrols
Number of Public Housing Sites
% Population in Public Housing

DEP
Components
t
p(t)
5.56
-5.13

0.000

-13.91

0.000

4.12
-1.61

0.000

0.000

0.108

-0.15

0.878

-0.31

0.754

1.32 0.187

-0.69

0.488

-0.63

0.531

-1.56

0.120

Drug Possession Arrests
(logged)

-3.08

0.002

Drug Sale Arrests (logged)

-1.16

0.248

1.67

0.097

Endogeneity

10.28 0.000

19.19

0.000

19.42

0.000

Population (Logged)

3.43 0.001

9.77

0.000

10.49

0.000

Poverty

3.76 0.000

-1.32

0.188

-1.36

0.176

Human Capital

4.62 0.000

-0.70

0.485

-0.90

0.372

Segregation

0.66 0.507

0.54
-0.35

0.589
0.727

Precinct Social Characteristics

Social Control - Supervision

0.239

1.36

0.178

0.374

-3.24

0.001

-3.59

0.001

Social Control - Anonymity

0.33 0.742

-1.93

0.054

-2.54

0.012

Immigration

1.50 0.133

Housing

-0.89

1.18

0.27

0.788

0.18

0.855

3.29

0.001

3.60

0.001

-1.05

0.292

DEP*Poverty

-0.75

0.454

-0.39

0.700

-0.34

0.738

DEP*Human Capital

-0.32

0.746

-0.78

0.435

-0.79

0.432

DEP Interactions

DEP*Segregation
DEP*Supervision
DEP*Anonymity

1.19 0.235
-0.12

1.45

0.150

1.19

0.238

0.908

-0.52

0.603

-0.45

0.654

1.05 0.292

-1.15

0.253

-1.81

0.072

0.506

-1.18

0.238

-1.17

0.245

DEP*Housing

0.73 0.467

-0.53

0.596

-0.81

0.421

Model Statistics: -2LL

-637.8

DEP*Immigration

-0.67

-314.20

-433.40
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effects-limited to public housing sites-should influence precinct-level property crime rates is a more difficult question. There is little modifying evidence to
suggest that these effects are specific to public housing sites, such as the
concentration of public housing in the precincts.
2. Tract Effects
Here, we are limited to analysis of homicide victimization rates, since
geocoded crime data are not publicly available for other crime measures. The
results of the tract analysis, shown in Table 10, are consistent with the precinct
analysis. DEP effects are large, statistically significant, and in the expected
direction. In the components analysis, OSH significantly predicts lower homicide
rates, but tenant patrols are not a significant predictor of homicide rates. These
models control for the effects of homicide in the surrounding census tracts.
Tracts with public housing sites have overall higher homicide rates compared
to other tracts, as shown graphically in Figure 1.114 In this table, the beneficial
effects of DEP are evident, even after we control for base rate differences in
homicide risk in public housing sites over time, and for homicide rates in
surrounding census tracts.
This analysis also shows that drug sale and drug possession arrests are
associated with higher homicide rates in census tracts. This counter-intuitive
effect is not surprising in the context of street-level drug markets. Higher drug
arrests are a marker for higher violence rates in both neighborhood studies" 5 and
city-level analyses. 116 Drug markets often are stable and institutionalized, despite
their illicit activity and the potential harms from drug abuse.'1 7 Disrupting

114. That is, the dummy variable for whether the tract contains a public housing site is statistically
significant in the binary and components models, but the coefficient is negative.
115. See JEFFREY FAGAN & GARTH DAVIES, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., THE EFFECTS OF DRUG
ENFORCEMENT ON THE RISE AND FALL OF HOMICIDE IN NEW YORK CITY, 1985-96 32 (2002).

116. See Graham Ousey & Matthew R. Lee, Examining the Conditional Nature of the Illicit Drug
Markets-Homicide Relationship:A PartialTest of the Theory of ContingentCausation,40 CRIMINOLOGY
73, 90 (2002) (correlation between drug trade and homicide is contingent on preexisting violenceconducive socioeconomic conditions); Eric Baumer et al., The Influence of Crack Cocaine on Robbery,
Burglary, and Homicide Rates: A Cross-City, Longitudinal Analysis, 35 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 316,
328-30 (1998) (net of other influences, cities with higher levels of crack use experienced larger increases
in robbery and higher homicide rates).
117. See Judith Matloff, Whose Neighborhood?, N.Y. TIMEs, July 14, 2002, at 14.1 (detailed account
of a northern Manhattan neighborhood where several drug sellers took strong measures to keep their
neighborhood safe and avoid attention from the police.). Several studies suggest that drug enforcement
removes established drug sellers from established territories, from organizational positions in drug
organizations, and from stable business relationships with customers. The vacuum created by aggressive
drug enforcement is quickly filled by competing drug-selling groups, and new sellers arrive to establish
business relationships with active buyers seeking new sources of drug supplies. But, when several groups
or individuals compete to fill these vacuums, the possibility arises for disputes and conflicts that are
settled by violence. Also, when organizations are destabilized by arrests, internal organizational conflicts
may arise as group members compete to assume higher positions in their organizations that were vacated
following arrests and convictions. Again, such internal instability may be resolved by violence. See, e.g.,
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Table 10. Mixed Effects Poisson Regression of DEP Effects on Homicide
Counts, New York City Census Tracts, 1985-96
DEP Binary
Effect
Intercept
Time
2

DEP
Investment

t

p(t)

t

p(t)

t

p(t)

-38.46

.000

-27.40

.000

-26.34

.000

15.33

.000

4.33

.000

Time

-14.59

.000

-4.25

.000

DEP

-11.91

.000

-6.16

.000

Operation Safe
Homes
Tenant Patrols
Public Housing Dummy

DEP
Components

1.29
-1.25

.213

-4.50

.000

1.23
-2.58

.010

-1.75

.080

.197

-1.70

.219
.089

Drug Arrests - Sale

3.59

.000

2.73

.006

2.62

.009

Drug Arrests Possession

0.18

.855

2.76

.006

2.91

.004

12.17

.000

12.85

.000

12.68

.000

Endogeneity

14.45

.000

22.97

.000

22.53

.000

Population (Logged)

33.48

.000

24.97

.000

25.03

.000

4.85

.000

0.36

.720

0.45

.652

Spatial Lag

Poverty
Human Capital

-1.52

.128

Segregation

15.76

.000

8.44

.000

8.55

.000

8.78

.000

5.81

.000

5.63

.000

Social Control Supervision

-0.89

.372

-0.82

.412

Social Control Anonymity

-2.41

.016

-0.93

.350

-0.61

.544

Immigration

-8.69

.000

-4.30

.000

-4.23

.000

Housing

3.60

.000

2.71

.007

0.09

.926

-0.11

.916

2.57

.010

DEP Interactions
DEP*Poverty

-1.45

.148

DEP*Human Capital

-0.31

.755

-0.02

.988

-0.12

.903

-0.94

.349

-1.15

.252

DEP*Segregation

0.86

.389

DEP*Supervision

1.96

.050

0.13

.897

0.29

.772

DEP*Anonymity

3.04

.002

0.52

.601

0.02

.980

DEP*Immigration

-0.70

.482

-0.32

.752

-0.19

.846

DEP*Housing

-0.02

.987

-0.17

.868

-0.03

.978

Model Statistics: -2LL

84199.0

38844.8

38813.2
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Table 11a. Mixed Effects Poisson Regression of DEP Effects on Reported
Violent Crime Rates, NYCHA Developments, 1986-94
DEP
DEP
Investment
Components
DEP Binary
Effect
Intercept
2

t

p(t)

-19.79

.000

-12.85

.000

-1.97

.050

.033

-0.46

.649

-2.30

Time

1.22

DEP

p(t)

p(t)

0.80

Time

t

t

.427

2.14

.021

-0.94

.350

.225

-0.08

.933

0.54

.586

Operation Safe Homes

-0.52

.606

Tenant Patrols

-0.79

.433

-2.95

.003

Drug Possession Arrests (log)

-1.68

.092

-2.85

.005

Drug Sale Arrests (log)

3.40

.001

0.34

.735

0.28

.783

Precinct Property Crime Rate

5.73

.000

3.52

.001

3.59

.000

Endogeneity

9.24

.000

8.70

.000

8.70

.000

33.55

.000

28.97

.000

28.86

.000

1.69

.091

1.85

.064

1.70

.090

11.38

.000

2.73

.007

2.86

.005

PH Development
Characteristics
Population (log)
Poverty
Supervision Ratio
(Seniors/Minors)
Employed (2 or more persons
in HH)

-1.87
2.71

Tenure

-1.32

Racial Heterogeneity

.061

-0.41

.685

-0.43

.670

.007

-0.10

.920

-0.01

.990

.187

0.17

.862

0.26

.795

.022

0.86

.391

0.92

.359

DEP Interactions
2.30

DEP*Poverty
DEP*Supervision

-4.22

.000

-0.76

.446

-0.85

.397

DEP*Employment

-1.09

.277

-0.32

.748

-0.32

.751

DEP*Tenure

-0.69

.493

DEP*Racial Fragmentation

- 1.40

.163

Model Statistics: -2LL

ROBERT J. MACCOUN

& PETER

PLACES 121-25 (2001).

2096.40

0.51
-1.97
1393.7

.611
.049

0.45
-1.98

.650
.049

1393.7
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Table llb. Mixed Effects Poisson Regression of DEP Effects on Reported
Property Crime Rate, NYCHA Developments, 1986-94
DEP
DEP
Investment
Components
DEP Binary
p(t)
t
p(t)
t
p(t)
t
Effect
Intercept
2

DEP

.000

-9.38

.000
.010

-. 09

.927

-9.41

.000

-. 86

.388

.26

.798

-1.38

.168

-. 84

.403
-. 33

.739

.14

.892

Tenant Patrols
Drug Sale Arrests (log)

.196

2.59

Operation Safe Homes
Drug Possession Arrests (log)

-1.30

.097

1.66

Time
Time

-11.90

0.29
-0.28

.774
.781

-1.25
-. 53
-1.35

.213
.596
.178

-1.10
-. 49
-1.38

.272
.625
.168

Precinct Property Crime Rate

0.00

.999

Endogeneity

8.47

.000

6.84

.000

6.87

.000

29.61

.000

25.45

.000

25.55

.000

Poverty

2.75

.006

2.90

.004

3.02

.003

Supervision Ratio
(Seniors/Minors)

3.08

.002

PH Development
Characteristics
Population (log)

Employed (2 or more persons
in HH)
Tenure
Racial Heterogeneity

-3.39
.55
-4.73

.001
.581
.000

-1.94
.68
-1.01
0.66

.053
.499
.315
.508

-2.10
.70
-1.10
.65

.037
.485
.273
.517

DEP Interactions
DEP*Poverty

1.52

-1.02

.310

-1.08

.279

.125

1.29

.197

1.38

.168

.98

.328

-. 66

.507

-. 68

.496

DEP*Tenure

1.05

.292

-. 46

.648

-. 41

.683

DEP*Racial Fragmentation

1.83

.068

DEP*Supervision
DEP*Employment

Model Statistics: -2LL

-1.54

.129

2523.2

-1.44

.151

1697.7

-1.48

.140

1676.3
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markets introduces instability, and such instability is often the spark for lethal
violence.11 8 High rates of arrests may have the short-term effect of destabilizing
drug markets by removing social controls exerted by drug organizations intent on
keeping neighborhoods stable to avoid problems with the police. 1 9 Accordingly,
drug enforcement may have a churning effect on drug markets that invites
instability and conflict. When drug offenders are removed via arrest, they were
quickly replaced by a supply of young men whose income potential seemed far better in
illegal work than in legal work. The competition among new sellers and newly
emerging organizations often is a fertile context for renewed and recurring violence.1 20
3. DEP Effects in NYCHA Developments
The third test was an analysis of whether the DEP interventions affected crime
within the public housing developments. The previous sections showed that there
were identifiable reductions in crime at the tract and precinct levels. When we
limited the analysis to changes in crime over time within the public housing
developments, we found no statistically significant effects of DEP interventions
in the housing projects themselves, either on violence or property crime rates.
Table 11 a shows the results for the analysis of DEP effects on violence. The
positive coefficients for the violence rate in the surrounding precinct suggest that
project crime rates are significantly influenced by what happens in the surrounding social context. Drug possession arrests in the projects also appear to influence
violent crime in two of the models, perhaps suggesting a demand-side suppression effect on drug markets due perhaps to increased police activity focused less
on sales than on drug possession. Table 1lb shows no effects of either DEP or
drug arrests or precinct crime rates on property crimes in public housing.
We suggest caution in comparing these models to our previous ones, given
differences in measurement and data sources. Recall that the measure of crime in
this analysis is taken from NYCHA incident reports, and its validity may differ
from police or public health data used in our previous analyses. At the same time,
any measurement error in this series is stable over time within sites, so estimates
of within-site changes in crime rates are likely to be stable. Accordingly, we
regard these results as reliable, and measurement error may have only a minor
influence on the size of the coefficients.

118. See Paul Goldstein et al., Crack and Homicide in New York City, 1988: A Conceptually-Based
Event Analysis, 16 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 651 (1989) (nearly three-quarters of drug-related homicides
in 1988 were "systemic" in nature - that is, they arose from market conflicts among dealers rather than
from the deranged behavior or economic needs of addicted users); see also generally Richard Curtis, The
Improbable Transformation Of Inner-City Neighborhoods: Crime, Violence, Drugs, And Youth In The
1990s, 88 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1233 (1998); Phillippe Bourgois, IN SEARCH OF RESPECT (1995).
119. See Robert Jackall, WILD COWBOYS 184-221 (1997) (discussing drug markets in New York City).
120. See id.; Bourgois, supra note 118, at 66-76; see also generally Jeffrey Fagan & Deanna L.
Wilkinson, Guns, Youth Violence and Social Identity in Inner Cities in YOUTH VIOLENCE (M. Tonry &
M.H. Moore, eds. 1998).

[Vol. XIH1

The Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law & Policy

Table 12. Summary of DEP Effects at Three Spatial Aggregations
DEP Binary
Police Precincts
Violent Crimes
Operation Safe Home
Tenant Patrols
Property Crimes
Operation Safe Home
Tenant Patrols
Census Tracts
Homicide Victimizations
Operation Safe Home
Tenant Patrols
Public Housing
Developments
Violent Crimes
Operation Safe Home
Tenant Patrols
Property Crimes
Operation Safe Home
Tenant Patrols

DEP
Investment

t

p(t)

t

p(t)

-5.55

.000

-9.10

.000

-6.91

-11.91

1.22

-1.38

.000

.000

.225

.168

-11.19

-6.16

-0.08

-0.84

DEP
Components
t

p(t)

-13.36
1.94

.000
.057

-13.91
4.12

.000
.000

-4.50
1.23

.000
.219

-0.52
-0.79

.606
.433

-0.33
0.14

.739
.892

.000

.000

.933

.403

All models controlled for social and economic contexts, crime rates in surrounding areas,
time (quadratic), and interactions of DEP indicator with contextual factors.

D. Summary
Table 12 provides a summary of the estimates of DEP effects on violence and
property crimes in and around public housing. The absence of effects within
public housing is less surprising in the context of how DEP funds were allocated
and applied by the NYPD. DEP was focused on housing sites, but also was
sufficiently diffused in the NYPD's broader administrative units-police service
areas, or PSAs-to provide resources that benefited law enforcement generally.
Seen this way, DEP was an important and strategically valuable supplement to
the NYPD's strategic response to a particularly acute violence and crime
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epidemic. '21 It allowed the police to focus not only on crimes in public housing,
but also in the surrounding areas as well. This strategy is consistent with the
reality that crime problems in public
housing are reciprocally tied to crime
22
1
areas.
surrounding
the
in
problems
As discussed in more detail in the following section, the absence of measurable
and positive effects within public housing speaks to the one-sided nature of the
enforcement strategy. The policing strategy was well-funded and heavily
resourced at a high level of patrol strength. It was active both within public
housing and the surrounding areas. The non-enforcement components of DEP
(tenant patrols and drug treatment for its residents) were targeted specifically
within public housing sites. These were poorly funded and the efforts diluted,
considering NYCHA's vast landscape. These low funding levels per site may
have limited the development and effectiveness of the non-enforcement approaches. Moreover, the reaction of minority communities to the NYPD's
aggressive police tactics may have led to adverse responses by residents to the
intensive drug patrols, animating their withdrawal from their own participation in
social control and security.1 23 The failure to mount viable interventions that
directly touched on the drug problems, social and economic lives, or normative
orientations of NYCHA residents may explain their withdrawal from social
regulation, and in turn, the absence of DEP effects within projects. In the next
section, we discuss the reasons why.
V. REIMAGINING DRUG CONTROL

DEP was launched in 1990 at the peak of New York City's epidemic of lethal
violence, much of which was animated by the explosive growth of street-level
drug markets.' 24 DEP was launched concurrently with other strong crime control
measures-most prominently, "Operation Safe Streets. '" 25 Within two years of
the launch of DEP and Operation Safe Streets, crime rates began to decline in the

121. Cf.generally GEORGE KELLING & WILLIAM SouzA, Do POLICE MATrER? AN ANALYSIS OF THE
IMPACT OF NEW YORK CrrY's POLICE REFORMS (2001), http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/cr_- 22.pdf
(arguing that New York's crime decline resulted from adoption of a strategy of aggressive policing of
social and physical disorder via "zero tolerance" policies and high rates of misdemeanor arrests, which in
turn had prophylactic effects on crime rates).
122. E.g., Dumanovsky et al., supra note 5.
123. See Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, Moral Solidarity,Identificationwith the Community, and the
Importance of ProceduralJustice: The Policeas PrototypicalRepresentativesof a Group'sMoral Values,
66 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 153, 159 (2003).
124. See Curtis, supra note 118, at 1248-51; Ansley Hamid, The PoliticalEconomy of Crack-Related
Violence, 17 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 31, 60-68 (1990); Bruce D. Johnson et al., Drug Abuse in the Inner
City: Impact on Hard-CoreDrug Users and the Community, 13 CRIME & JUST. 9, 27, 30-39 (1990).
125. See KARMEN, supra note 49, at 95; see also MICHAEL E. SMrH ET AL., THE VERA INSTITUTE OF
JUSTICE, THE NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECTS OF STREET LEVEL ENFORCEMENT: TACTICAL NARCOTICS TEAMS IN

NEw YORK: AN EVALUATION OF TNT (1992).
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city.126 Homicide and non-lethal injuries, a reliable measure of criminal violence

that is independent of police reporting influences, declined slowly in 1992 and
1993, and then began a precipitous decline that lasted through the end of the
decade.' 2 7 Apportioning this reduction to DEP, other crime control measures, a
general decline in drug epidemics, or to a secular decline in violence and crime
due to economic or other social forces is a conceptual and empirical challenge
and a contentious public policy debate.
In this study, we attempted to isolate the effects of DEP as one such policy
change. Using official records, we also show how formal social control--drug
arrests, primarily, conducted by special teams--contributed to the reduction of
crime and violence in the areas surrounding public housing, but appeared to have
little influence on the public housing sites they targeted. Based on this trend, we
draw lessons about DEP and about social control in public housing.
A. Drug Control as Leveraged Social Control
Public housing in New York City accounts for a sizable portion of housing in
many poor neighborhoods, and in some communities it is the primary type of
housing. 12 8 Although crime rates sometimes differ in public housing compared to
the surrounding area, public housing developments and the neighborhoods
surrounding them exert a strong influence on each other. Also, the correlates of
crime in public housing are not necessarily those found in the city as a whole, or
in other poor urban areas. 129 Accordingly, the embeddedness of public housing in
broader ecological dynamics of their surrounding neighborhoods is an empirical
fact that bears on the impacts of the DEP program.
The diffusion of social order and patterns of social exchanges in public
housing "neighborhoods" suggests that the fates of persons living in public
housing and persons living in their surrounding areas are tightly linked. Policy
decisions that located public housing in specific neighborhoods, which themselves already were burdened by concentrated poverty, racial segregation, and
weakened mechanisms of informal social control, placed those burdens de facto
on the residents of public housing. This history of urban development reciprocally shaped neighborhood ecologies and the fates of public housing developments. 130 The effects of more recent policy decisions concerning changes in
welfare policy, housing policies, and public housing eligibility are still unknown.
But, together with well-publicized changes in police intervention strategies in
126. See Jeffrey Fagan et al., DecliningHomicide in New York: A Tale of Two Epidemics, 88 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1277, 1279 (1998).
127. See generally Natural History,supra note 97.
128. Marcuse, supra note 1, at 250-51; see also Susan Saegert et al., Social Capital and the
Revitalizationof New York City's DistressedInner-City Neighborhoods,9 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 17, 24

(1998).
129. See generally GARTH DAVIES, CRIME,
130. Marcuse, supra note 1, at 242.

NEIGHBORHOOD AND PUBLIC HOUSING

(2006).
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New York City, 13 ' housing policy decisions that target drugs and crime held out
the promise to significantly improve the ecology of poor neighborhoods.
DEP must be viewed, then, not just in its ability to root out and suppress drug
and crime problems in public housing, but in its ability to foster sustainable
changes in public housing residents' capacity for social control. The first goal-to
root out crime and drug problems-was pursued through strong investments of
DEP funds in Operation Safe Homes, increasing patrol strength and focusing its
resources in pubic housing. OSH was coupled with special prosecutions of public
housing residents to intensify its deterrence efforts.
The second goal-strengthening informal social control by increasing resident
participation in patrol and other collective action projects-was informed by
theories that emphasize the importance of social regulation and collective
efficacy in reducing crime. 132 DEP pursued this goal, for a time, by investing in
tenant organizations and social services that would enhance the capacity of
citizens to exert social control by (a) building social ties between citizens and (b)
strengthening ties between citizens and law enforcement. 1 33 These processes
were designed to strengthen forms of informal social control to reduce crime and
drug problems. In other words, DEP was designed to promote the expansion of
social capital by increasing the capacity for supervision.
B. Diffusion of Efforts in a PoliticalContext
When interviewed, residents reported that drug and alcohol problems improved in public housing, and that crime and unwarranted police harassment also
declined during this time. 1 34 Physical and social disorder also waned as a
perceived problem in and around many of the public housing sites included in
these surveys. But residents said that these improvements were unrelated to DEP
programs, and that policing under DEP was largely unchanged from previous
eras. 135 Residents reported that their involvement with the police, as well as
social ties among residents, remained unchanged, and few respondents reported
general improvements in their perceived safety. 136 Social capital-as measured

131. See, e.g., KELLING & COLES, supra note 47, at 109-10.
132. Robert J. Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Model of Collective
Efficacy, 277 SCIENCE 918 (1997).
133. Id; BURSIK & GRASMICK, supra note 97, at 151; cf also WESLEY SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE
126-29 (1990).
134. See DRUG CONTROL INPUBLIC HOUSING, supra note 51, at 68-69. In this study, interviews were
completed with 752 respondents-including residents and NYCHA staff in sixty-two NYCHA
developments located in nineteen neighborhoods-in 1998-2000. Of these 752, 87.3% were NYCHA
residents. Id. at 52-53.
135. Id. at 95, 103. See also OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., OFFICE OF PUB. AND INDIAN Hous.,
MuLri-DisTRicT AUDIT PUBLIC HOUSING DRUG ELIMINATION PROGRAM (1999). Note: NYCHA was not
one of the grantees audited for this report.
136. DRUG CONTROL IN PUBLIC HOUSING, supra note 51, at 65-118. Survey data revealed that tenant
involvement remained unchanged in most of the public housing sites, and few respondents reported
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in these interviews by the extent of local social ties and citizen interactionseither declined or remained unchanged in most public housing sites. 137 Residents
generally were unwilling to attribute improvements in the problems of drugs,
crime and disorder to better policing, stronger tenant activity, or closer ties
138
among public housing residents.
Thus the good news of perceived improvements in tenants' lives is tempered
by the fact that the perceived sources of these improvements were unrelated to
DEP, or to other measurable or sustainable changes in social interactions or social
organization among public housing tenants. The goal to strengthen social capital
and informal social control involved transfer of some burden of social control
over time from police to citizens. Social control is strongest when citizens partner
with legal actors to enforce laws. 139 In DEP, the balance of social control
functions remained primarily the province of the police, and these efforts were
diffused throughout the department, often with harsh effects.' 40 Despite the
intention to address crime and drug problems in public housing, police
internalized DEP funds as part of an overall strategic facelift for the department.
The disproportionate allocation of DEP funds to enforcement and the relatively
smaller and more diluted investments in tenant programs (informal social
control) were noted by residents. 14 1 In contrast, DEP resources for tenant social
and preventive programs were diffused throughout NYCHA's public housing
sites. These programs were generally underfunded, thematically inconsistent, and
not created with an eye toward permanence or even sustainability. In key

general improvements in their perceived safety. The stability of perceived fear in the face of declining
crime rates is an old story in criminological research. See SKOGAN, supra note 133, at 47-48, 76-77
(1990).
137. DRUG CONTROL INPUBLIC HOUSING, supra note 51, at 118.
138. Id. at 118.
139. See generally CHARLES TrrTLE, CONTROL BALANCE (1996).
140. "Operation Condor," an initiative of the New York City Police Department that used overtime
pay to motivate police officers to make "buy-and-bust" arrests for drug offenses, was created during this
era. The program produced thousands of arrests across the city, but its tactics raised complaints from
minority citizens about its racial disproportionality, and the excessive use of a full criminal justice
process (including the use of pretrial detention rather than summons) for low-level drug offenders whose
crimes were mostly non-violent and who posed a minimal public safety threat. The death of Patrick
Dorismond, an unarmed citizen who was approached by Condor officers who tried to sell him marijuana
during an Operation Condor arrest, heightened racial tensions between minority citizens and the police.
William Rashbaum, Police Suspend Extra Patrolsfor 10 Days, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 10, 2000, at B 1; see also
Jeffrey Rosen, Excessive Force: Why PatrickDorismond Didn't Have to Die, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 10,
2000, at 24.
141. DRUG CONTROL IN PUBLIC HOUSING, supra note 51, 119-20. Whatever gains were made in
perceived reductions in drug, crime and disorder problems evidently reflected the suppression of those
problems through the type of aggressive enforcement that characterized policing generally during that
era. See generally BRATrON & KNOBLER, supra note 46. See also HARCOURT, supra note 49, at 92-95
(2001). The merger of the Housing Police with the NYPD facilitated more uniform implementation of the
strategies and tactics of Order-Maintenance Policing (OMP) and aggressive drug enforcement marked by
buy-and-bust tactics such as Operation Condor. See Christopher Ketcham, Roach Motel, SALON, Oct. 17,
2002, http:// archive salon.com/mwt/feature/2002/10/17.
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informant interviews, 142 law enforcement officials, NYCHA administration, and
tenant leaders all described DEP as a program that was primarily a supplement to
ongoing policing programs, that was indistinguishable from the routine policing
tactics in public housing, and that only casually and haphazardly supported social
developmental or preventive programs.1 43 They characterized Operation Safe
Homes DEP funds as a means to expand policing, not to develop new forms of
patrol that reflected the reality of public housing or its unique crime problems.
Under DEP, no special programs were created, no new initiatives were developed
or tested, and nothing sustainable apart from everyday command-and-control
policing was developed or sustained under this program. 44
Police tactics in this era were controversial and racialized, and the racial
imbalances in policing often were flashpoints for social tension between minority
citizens and police since 1994.145 The concentration of African-Americans and
Hispanics in public housing increased their exposure to the aggressive police
tactics of this era. In many African-American communities, the racial breach was
an impediment to police-citizen cooperation. In public housing, OSH extended
these policing tactics to largely poor and non-white citizens, weakening the
possibilities for police-citizen cooperation to create the reciprocal social controls
essential to effective crime control. Many respondents complained that these
tactics tended to isolate citizens from the police and offered no incentive for
citizens to engage with one another or with OSH or the police generally in the
co-production of security. 146 Instead, citizens continued their reliance on formal
social control, and the difficult and delicate process of social capital development
was stillborn.
Many of these complaints applied equally to the Anti-Narcotic Strike Force. 147
At a time when the courts in New York City were returning to a philosophy of
individualized justice, and in a historical context when the courts were
reorganizing in most boroughs to provide drug treatment services and a theory of
therapeutic jurisprudence, 1 48 the ANSF pursued an aggressive program of
prosecution of both petty and serious drug offenders in public housing. Treatment
was not a part of ANSF actions, which were focused on either the removal of
offending families from public housing or the incarceration of drug offenders.
Cases were brought against public housing tenants without discretion, and with
142. Key informants included twelve NYPD police officers from all PSAs in the city, thirteen tenant
association leaders and providers of DEP-funded social service programs within NYCHA. DRUG
CorOrtOL IN PUBLiC HoUsING, supra note 51, at 70, 77-78.
143. Id. at 94.
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., id. at 95; David Kocieniewski, Success of Elite Police Unit Exacts a Toll on the Streets,
N.Y. TMms, Feb. 15, 1999, at Al; Kit R. Roane, Minority Private-School Students Claim Police
Harassment,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1999, at B5.
146. DRUG CONTROL IN PUBLIC HOUSING, supra note 51, at 120.
147. Id. at 121; see supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
148. See generally Berman et al., supra note 50. Drug treatment courts opened during this time in
every borough except Manhattan.
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little attention to the individual context of the case or the potential impact of
prosecution on collateral parties. Nearly all incidents were processed formally
through one or more available legal routes. While key informants saw some
prosecutions as important weapons against well-organized drug dealers, the
formality of ANSF also led to prosecutions of low-level users and drug
not seen as contributing
possessors whose incarceration or eviction was
49
substantially to drug control or crime reduction. 1
DEP perhaps was a lost opportunity, both for innovation and for testing of new
ways to control and eliminate drug problems. Identifying the unique contributions of DEP in an era of declining crime rates is difficult, and was further
complicated by its diffused implementation. Additionally, the blurring of lines
between everyday police patrol and OSH (especially post-merger) defeated
efforts to rigorously estimate the crime control effects of special policing in the
PSAs and in the public housing sites. The narrow scope of interventions, inability
to distinguish the DEP component from ongoing policies and tactics, and the
generally weak "dosage" of efforts or investment in social programs and tenant
patrol across the 184 public housing sites, formed a weak program that was
insufficient in vision, theory, and execution. On this conclusion, public housing
residents and other key informants all seem to agree.
C. Social Norms and Drug Control in Public Housing
There are realizable pathways to the original vision of DEP that offer the
promise of sustainable impacts that can accomplish both the crime suppression
and social developmental components of DEP. The essential kernel is a strategy
that brings citizens and police into closer collaboration to address problems of
crime, drugs and disorder. But DEP offered no new vision of policing, and in fact,
simply intensified policing and prosecution practices that were already antagonistic to many citizens.
The incentives for people to engage with legal actors in social regulation and
the co-production of security may lie in their evaluations of their treatment by the
police. 150 Fairness and crackdowns may be inconsistent, but at least citizens
know that they are tradeoffs. Recent work by Tom Tyler, based on a survey of
residents in three Oakland, California, neighborhoods, suggests that citizens'
evaluations of legal actors are not linked to the outcomes of their court cases or
interactions with police, or on the crime rate in their neighborhood. 151 Rather,

149. DRUG CONTROL IN PUBLIC HOUSING, supra note 51, at 121.
150. See, e.g., TOM TYLER & Y. Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH
THE POLICE AND COURTS (2002); Tom R. Tyler, Public Trust and Confidence in Legal Authorities: What
Do Majority and Minority Group Members Want from the Law and Legal Institutions?, 19 BEHAV. SCI. &
L. 215 (2001); Ronald Weitzer, Racialized Policing: Residents'Perceptionsin Three Neighborhoods, 34
LAW & Soc'Y REV. 129 (2000).
151. TYLER & HUo, supra note 150, at 181-84.
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Tyler concludes that these evaluations are based on the procedural fairness of
their treatment by those authorities. Ronald Weitzer reaches the same conclusion
in a survey of residents of three neighborhoods in Washington D.C.' 5 2 He reports
contrasting evaluations of police services in two predominantly black neighborhoods: proactive policing of residents of a poor, high-crime neighborhood
elicited less favorable reactions to police than did the more reactive 53and
respectful treatment of citizens in an "orderly" middle-class neighborhood. 1
Although the law is based on the implicit or explicit threat of sanctioning for
wrongdoing, the legal system depends heavily on voluntary compliance from
most citizens to set and enforce norms and to engage with the police in social
control. Hence, lower levels of legitimacy make social regulation more costly
and difficult, both materially and politically. The police depend heavily on the
voluntary cooperation of citizens to fight crime. Citizens report crime and
criminals, informally help to police their neighborhoods, and aid the courts as
jurors and witnesses. Without these cooperative acts from the public, the police
risk being seen as an intrusive force imposing order. And without these acts, the
meaning of order becomes detached from its social basis and loses its moral
weight to influence others in the community.
A social norms approach would invite policing of drug problems in the context
of corresponding and contemporaneous extra-legal social initiatives aimed at the
same or parallel problems. 154 These realistically balanced efforts reflect a more
complex view of the interaction of crime and drugs, one that recognizes their
relationship to broader social and physical conditions within neighborhoods.
While OSH and ANSF approaches might promote a temporary reduction of
crime through suppression, a legitimacy-focused approach would promote
construction of social networks that integrate community-level social processes
with the regulation of crime and disorder.
CONCLUSION

For decades, violence, drugs, and public housing have been closely linked in
political and popular cultures. In 1990, HUD made funds available to public
housing authorities to combat drug and crime problems. DEP programs
combined police enforcement, drug treatment, drug prevention, youth and gang
outreach, community organizing, integrated health and social service agencies,
and tenant mobilization projects, in an ambitious and complex intervention to
152. Weitzer, supra note 150.
153. See id. at 145-48. Weitzer's findings stand "Broken Windows" theory on its head by suggesting
that the police may be reacting to visible cues of crime and disorder, not just would-be criminals who
might journey to a disorderly neighborhood to take advantage of crime opportunities. Weitzer's findings
suggest that in neighborhoods with visible signs of disorder, police react with indiscriminate and
widespread patterns of aggressive stops and interdiction of citizens.
154. See generally, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Social Organizationand Drug Law Enforcement, 35 AM.

CRIM. L. REv. 191 (1998).
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control drug use and drug selling in public housing. In New York, NYCHA spent
$165 million on DEP in its 330 public housing sites between 1990 and 1996. We
examined the effects of DEP interventions at three levels of complementary
theoretical relevance: the public housing development itself, the neighborhood in
which public housing is situated, and the police precinct where the tract is
located. We used spatial analyses and hierarchical regressions to estimate DEP
effects on drug and crime in public housing sites and surrounding neighborhoods.
Crime and drug problems were reduced in the immediate neighborhoods and
surrounding police precincts, but crime and drug problems in public housing
were unaffected by DEP interventions. The absence of effects within public
housing reflects the shortcomings in the architecture of DEP and its tactical
decision to disproportionately allocate its resources to policing strategies
compared to demand reduction and informal social control programs. DEP police
efforts were focused on housing sites, but also were diffused in the NYPD's
broader administrative units to provide resources that benefited law enforcement
generally, shifting the spotlight away from public housing. Seen this way, DEP
was an important and valuable supplement to the NYPD's strategic response to a
particularly acute violence and crime epidemic, but did little to alter the basic
social organization of crime and drugs within the housing units themselves. We
argue for an intervention model that promotes interactions between residents and
for collective actions to enhance citizen compliance and cooperation with police.
The police depend heavily on the voluntary cooperation of citizens to fight crime,
yet DEP allocated its resources in a way that simply strengthened existing
disincentives for such cooperation. This social norms approach would invite
policing of drug problems in the context of a legitimacy-focused approach that
promotes citizen-based regulation of crime and disorder.

